Strict Products Liability: The Irrelevance of Foreseeability and Related Negligence Concepts by Dahl, Tyrus V., Jr.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 14 Issue 2 
1978 
Strict Products Liability: The Irrelevance of Foreseeability and 
Related Negligence Concepts 
Tyrus V. Dahl Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tyrus V. Dahl Jr., Strict Products Liability: The Irrelevance of Foreseeability and Related Negligence 
Concepts, 14 Tulsa L. J. 338 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss2/3 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENTS
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE
IRRELEVANCE OF FORESEEABILITY AND
RELATED NEGLIGENCE CONCEPTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Strict products liability was conceived and nurtured as a bastard
stepchild among the legitimate fraternal twins of negligence and war-
ranty. As a result, not only was the terminology of negligence and war-
ranty imparted to the concept of strict liability but there was also an
accompanying confusion of tort and contract principles.' Strict liabil-
ity was gradually adopted as a tort, however, and reliance upon the
language of warranty became less pronounced.' Unfortunately, the
negligence terminology, and often-and more importantly-the negli-
gence concept itself, has remained firmly attached to strict liability in a
manner which is inconsistent with strict liability's policy of consumer
protection and with the enterprise theory of risk aliocation.
3
Principal among the misapplied negligence concepts is that of for-
seeability.4 To say that a defect, a hazard, or an injured plaintiff is
foreseeable to a supplier of a product is to say nothing more than that
the supplier was negligent for injecting foreseeable harm into the mar-
ketplace. A fundamental premise of this paper is that strict liability is
not dependent upon negligence5 and that the manufacturer or supplier
of a defective product is liable for resulting harm even if he has exer-
cised due care.6
1. See generally Donnelly, After The Fall of the Citadel" Exploitation of the Victor)' or Consid-
eration of All Interests?, 19 SYnRcusE L. REv. 1 (1967).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] Ex-
planatory Notes § 402A, comment m, at 355 (1965): "The basis of liability is purely one of tort."
See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1962); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972); Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment,
11 J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1968); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960).
4. "[T]he doctrine of foreseeability, although a recognized doctrine where ordinary negli-
gence in tort is involved, has no part in the concept of strict liability in tort." Howes v. Hansen, 56
Wis. 2d 247, -, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831 (1972).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402 A, comment n, at 365: "[T]he liability with
which this section deals is not based upon the negligence of the seller, but is strict liability ......
6. Id., § 402 A(2)(a). A concise and conclusive definition of strict liability may be said to be
"liability imposed on a manufacturer of a chattel because of an injury caused to plaintiff or his
1
Dahl: Strict Products Liability: The Irrelevance of Foreseeability and
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
1978] STRICT PROD UCTS LIABILITY
Nevertheless, strict liability does not mean absolute liability,7 and
the question remains one of determining the limits of liability short of
requiring only that the product cause an injury. 8 This article will dis-
cuss three possible limitations on liability: contributory negligence and
its modem counterpart, comparative negligence;9 assumption of risk;'"
and alteration and misuse.l" The focus of the article, however, will be
on the inappropriate use of foreseeability as a limitation upon strict
products liability. Of necessity, adnate negligence concepts such as
duty and breach of duty,'2 knowable and unknowable risks,' 3 the state
of the art defense,' 4 duty to warn,' -5 and proximate causation' 6 are also
examined. Eliminating foreseeability as a test of liability affects them
all.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF STRICT
LIABILITY
A comprehensive account of the rise and development of strict lia-
bility and its eventual application to products' 7 is beyond the scope of
property by the condition of the chattel, without regard to the presence or absence of his negli-
gence." Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
7. See, e.g., Kissel, Defenses to Strict Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 450 (1972).
8. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, -, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974).
9. See notes 148-73 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 174-202 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 203-22 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 40-63 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 64-78 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 79-89 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 90-109 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 110-38 infra and accompanying text.
17. The products liability concept is embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2,
§ 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractural relation with the seller.
There has been much discussion of the language of the Restatement (Second) concerning "defec-
tive condition" (comments g and h) and "unreasonably dangerous" (comment i), and a resolution
of the conflict is outside the parameters of this article. It should be noted, however, that some
jurisdictions have eliminated the requirement that a plaintiff prove the product was defective. See,
e.g., Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274
Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969). Other jurisdictions have eliminated the requirement
that the product be "unreasonably dangerous." See, e.g., Anderson v. Fairchild Miller Corp., 358
2
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this article. 8 It should be noted, however, that in the most elemental
sense, leaving aside medieval concepts that one who caused harm was
liable regardless of negligence, the strict liability standard arose from a
small category of exceptions to the rules of negligence. 19 These narrow
exceptions included the keeping of wild animals,20 the sale of food, 2t
and ultrahazardous activities.2 2 For these exceptions, liability was im-
posed without regard to fault or culpability on the part of the defend-
ant.23 But applying strict liability to manufacturers and suppliers
generally was long thought to be a concept "characteristic of medieval
times"' 4 and "long-discarded. 2 5
F. Supp. 976 (D. Alas. 1973); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972); Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). The
courts in the latter instances have correctly perceived that "unreasonably dangerous" is based
upon the reasonable person standard of negligence. The Berkebile case held that such a standard
has no place in strict liability thereby obviating any requirement of reasonableness. However, this
view has been criticised in the federal court as not being the law in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Beron
v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1276-77 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affTd, 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir.
1976) (per curiam). See also Bunn v. Catepillar Tractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286, 288-89 (W.D. Pa.
1976), a]/'d, 556 F.2d 564 (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). New Jersey is an exam-
ple of the rapid flux. Having dispensed with the unreasonably dangerous requirement in Glass v.
Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973), the state restored it in Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
18. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402A, comment c, at 348-49;
Dickerson, The ABC's ofroducts Liability-With A Close Look at Section 402,4 and the Code, 36
TENN. L. REv. 439 (1969); Franklin, Tort Liability/or Hepatitis." An Analysis and a Proposal, 24
STAN. L. REv. 439 (1972); James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923 (1957); Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72
HARV. L. REv. 401 (1959); Lascher, Strict Liability In Tort For Defective Products.- The Road To
andPast andermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 30 (1965); Prosser, The Fall ofthe Citadel (Strict Liabil-
ity to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. RE. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). For opinions generally opposing the ascen-
dancy of strict liability, see generally the dissenting opinions in Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor,
215 Ark. 630,-, 222 S.W.2d 820, 828 (1949) and Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, -, 220 A.2d 853, 855
(1966); Green, Should The Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24
TENN. L. REv. 928 (1957); Plant, Strict Liability ofManuacturersfor Injuries Caused by Defects in
Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957).
19. J. HENDERSON & R. PETERSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 522 (1975). RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), supra note 2, § 402A, comment b, at 348.
20. Filburn v. People's Palace & Aquarium Co., [1890] 25 Q.B.D. 258. See also Annot. 69
A.L.R. 500 (1930) and Annot. 21 A.L.R.3d 603 (1968).
21. "In the sale of provisions for domestic use, the vendor is bound to know that they are
sound and wholesome at his peril. This is a principle. necessary to the preservation of health
and life." Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. Ch. 468, -, 7 Am. Dec. 339, 339 (N.Y. 1815).
22. Seigler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972); Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. I
Ex. 265 (1866), aft'd, 3 H.L. 330 (1868). See also Prosser, The Principle ofRylands v. Fletcher, in
SELECTED Topics IN THE LAW OF TORTS, 135, 149-64 (1954).
23. Nevertheless, one court has held that "strict liability . . . is a tortious action based
squarely on the concept of culpability or fault." Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 141 Ga. App. 371, -,
233 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1977). Still, the same court determined that reasonable care was not a de-
fense, and strict liability was found to be the equivalent of negligence per se. Id.
24. Plant, supra note 18, at 939.
25. Id.
3
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Strict liability for products came into its own in a case of "lathes
on the loose."26 Justice Traynor wrote the opinion in this case, Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.," for a unanimous California
Supreme Court. The policy considerations underlying not only that
decision but also the principle of strict liability itself can be found in his
concurring opinion, written two decades before, in Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. :2
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unpre-
pared to meet its consequences. The cost of injury and the
loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to
the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of the in-
jury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business. . . . However
intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphaz-
ardly they may strike, the risk of their occurence is a constant
and general one. Against such a risk there should be general
and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated
to afford such protection.29
In addition, manufacturers are in the best position to research, to in-
spect, to supervise, and continually to replace their best practices with
better ones. As Mr. Justice Holmes observed, "[I]t may be considered
that the safest way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person
who decides what precautions shall be taken."30
Succinctly stated, the purposes of strict products liability have
been recognized as one or more of the following: (1) economic distri-
bution of injury costs throughout society, (2) risk distribution, (3) en-
hanced emphasis on safety through imposition of liability upon
nonnegligent manufacturers and suppliers, (4) protection, or at least
partial indemnification, of consumers vulnerable to technological
hazards, and (5) elimination of the formalistic and highly technical
confusion of the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code as applied to breach of warranty.3'
Not unexpectedly, strict liability was shunned during the Indus-
trial Revolution because it was feared that responsibility for increasing
26. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defectdve Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
REv. 363, 376 (1965).
27. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
28. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
29. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
30. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 93 (1881).
31. Cf. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1062-66 (1967). See generally The Assault Upon the Cita-
del, supra note 18.
1978]
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injuries and death not directly related to negligence would unduly
curtail fledgling industries and retard economic and technological pro-
gress. But that "assumption rested on the oft-disproved notion that
wheels operate at peak efficiency when unattended by brakes. 3 z To-
day it is generally recognized as a matter of policy that no current soci-
etal interest is forwarded by allowing a manufacturer who places a
defective article into the stream of commerce to avoid responsibility for
damages which it causes.3 3 Strict liability is imposed primarily for so-
cial policy reasons to assure an allocation of risks34 throughout society
with the consequential distribution of the cost of damages which are
inevitable in a highly technological existence. Such damages are seen
as merely another cost of doing business.35 Secondarily, the interests of
enhanced safety for products are furthered.36
It cannot be overemphasized that a finding of negligence is not
necessary to the imposition of strict products liability in tort. The most
important distinction between negligence and strict liability is that, un-
like negligence, strict liability has no requirement that the dangerous
product reach the marketplace or consumer through any fault of the
manufacturer or supplier. Even though a manufacturer has exercised
every precaution in the production and distribution of a product, he
must bear the costs if harm results37 subject only to certain narrow limi-
tations discussed hereinafter.38 While it is often said that strict liability
is a tort without fault in the traditional sense, it would perhaps be more
32. Traynor, supra note 26, at 364.
33. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974). But
merely manufacturing a defective product which causes injury and which has not reached the
marketplace has been held insufficient for strict liability. Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d
282, -, 369 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1977).
34. Dean Prosser noted that, while "risk distributing" is a favorite theory of the professors, it
is not often found in the cases and appears generally as a makeweight. Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel, supra note 18, at 800.
35. The purpose of such [strict] liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or damage,
either to the goods sold or to other property, resulting from defective products, is borne
by the makers of the product who put them in the channels of trade, rather than by the
injured or damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves.
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian. Inc., 44 N.J. 52, -, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965).
36. Perhaps "consumers can be taught to be more careful if the law penalizes them for im-
prudence. Fostering careful manufacture is, however, more important than discovering incautious
consumption. Pernicious products should be scrapped in the factory rather than dodged in the
home." Morris, Negligence in Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 899, 909 (1967). Any suggestion that
enhanced recovery would encouarge carelessness on the part of the consumer dismisses the con-
sumer's natural tendency to prefer no injury at all to monetary compensation therefor.
37. Cf. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910), wherein a
ship's owner was held liable for damages done to plaintiffs dock to which the ship was rightfully
and lawfully docked during a storm. Although the owner sought only to protect his ship from the
tempest, he was nevertheless required to pay for the damage to the plaintiffs dock which resulted.
38. See notes 139-224 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 14:338
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accurate to deem it a tort without negligence. Even if one is not negli-
gent in placing a potentially harmful commodity in the stream of com-
merce, and that commodity does in fact result in injury, that very act
cannot necessarily be termed faultless and may be legally and ethically
culpable.3 9 The semantical distinctions among blame, culpability,
fault, and the like may be avoided as long as it is manifest that negli-
gence in whatever form is not a prerequisite to strict products liability
in tort. Once this is established, the attendant trappings of negligence
fall away from the corpus of strict liability, and the policy goals out-
lined above may truly be achieved.
III. THE IRRELEVANCE OF FORESEEABILITY
The application, or rather misapplication, of negligence concepts
to strict products liability has been pervasive. Early advocates of the
doctrine did not appear to question foreseeability as a natural limita-
tion upon strict products liability, and the test was variously applied to
foreseeable defects, foreseeable harm, and foreseeable plaintiffs.40 The
courts and commentators, apparently well-schooled in the practice of
attaching liability only where the defendant's conduct fell below the
standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent person, had dif-
ficulty finding liability where such reasonable care was found to have
been taken.41
The misapplication of foreseeability as a limitation on strict prod-
ucts liability, however, goes even further. In addition to being the de-
terminant for the limits of duty under a conventional risk analysis,
foreseeability has a major bearing upon proximate causation and the
defenses of contributory and comparative negligence, abnormal use, al-
teration, the state of the art, and assumption of risk.
Foreseeability is a test for determining whether a defendant exer-
39. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1089 (1965).
There are also those who believe that strict liability has "accomplished little for the consumer and
it has had little impact upon practice." Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Sup-
plierA Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521, 531 (1974). Rheingold maintains that negligence is "hot"
and strict liability is "cold" and that a plaintiff is in a position to receive substantially larger
awards by showing that the defendant is at fault. Id. For a more theistic approach, see Lucey,
Liability Without Fault and the Natural Law, 24 TENN. L. REV. 952 (1957).
40. "This enterprise liability should not be unlimited, but it should extend to all casualties
and hazards that are injected into society by the activity of the enterprise, at least to the extent that
they are. . . reasonablyforeseeable." James, supra note 18, at 927 (emphasis added).
41. For an analysis of the foreseeability doctrine as applied to products liability cases in
negligence, see Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 71
YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
42. Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort
Law, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 101, 101-02 (1976).
1978]
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cised due care. It is illogical to apply foreseeability to strict products
liability since a finding of lack of due care is not required to establish
liability. One of the cases to recognize this inconsistency, Green v.
American Tobacco Co.,41 did so in a warranty action. The Supreme
Court of Florida, upon certification of a question from the federal dis-
trict court,44 held that Florida case law affirmatively established that
implied warranty is not limited by the doctrine of foreseeability. 45 This
same reasoning logically carries over to strict liability, and it has long
been so applied in cases involving foods in which the producer or re-
tailer could not have foreseen a defective condition.46 Nevertheless, the
concept of the irrelevance of foreseeability has troubled courts when
applied to products. One case which resolved the problem in favor of
the inapplicability of foreseeability was Howes v. Hansen,4 7 wherein the
court held that "the doctrine of foreseeability, although a recognized
doctrine where ordinary negligence in tort is involved, has no part in
the concept of strict liability in tort."'48 The court in Hoves, however,
relied on still another negligence concept and found that strict products
liability is imposed essentially on the basis of negligence per se, in
which foreseeability plays no role of limitation.49 Resorting to such an
43. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
44. The certification was part of a lengthy journey in the courts as evidenced by the full
citation of the case: Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), on rehearing,
304 F.2d 85 (per curiam), on certification, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), on receipt of answers to
cert/ication, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964). See also Ross v. Philip
Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying Missouri law); Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Pritchard v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
45. 154 So. 2d at 172-73.
46. See, eg., Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, -, 164 S.W.2d 835, 839-40 (Civ.
App.), atd, 165 S.W.2d 201 (1942). Contra, Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251
S.W.2d 153 (1952) (involving a wholesaler based on foreseeability).
47. 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
48. Id. at -, 201 N.W.2d at 831.
49. This has been explained as follows:
Negligence per se was defined in Osborne v. Montgomery, (1931) 203 Wis. 223, 240,
234 N.W. 372, 378 ... : "We come now to a consideration of that class of cases where
foreseeability is not an element of negligence,--a more accurate statement would be to
that class of cases where the defendant is foreclosed or concluded upon the question of
foreseeability. In all those cases where it is said that the performance of the wrongful act
being admitted the defendant is guilty of negligence as a matter of law or that the act is
negligent per se, the case is one which admits of no question as to reasonable anticipa-
tion or foreseeability. These cases are those in the main where the act amounts to a
violation of a standard of care fixed by statute (ordinance) or previous decision."
Id. at--, 201 N.W.2d at 831. Contra, Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F.
Supp. 598, 604 n.9 (D. Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law), wherein the court said that "foreseeabil-
ity is an important element of strict products liability law and has long been a part of tort jurispru-
dence in Idaho," and specifically rejected Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825
(1972).
7
Dahl: Strict Products Liability: The Irrelevance of Foreseeability and
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
STRICT PROD UCTS LIABILITY
analogy is unnecessary and reminiscent of those cases which reasoned
that foreseeability is merely another name for scienter.50 The courts
have clearly felt the pull of negligence law in the need to find culpabil-
ity, negligence per se, scienter, or fault in some form in order to hold a
manufacturer liable." To do so, however, is to misread the policy re-
quirements of strict liability.
The better reasoned rule in such cases-and an excellent statement
of the thesis of this article-was articulated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp.: 2
To require foreseeability is to require the manufacturer to use
due care in preparing his product. In strict liability, the man-
ufacturer is liable even if he has exercised all due care. Fore-
seeability is not a test of proximate cause; it is a test of
negligence. Because the seller is liable in strict liability re-
gardless of any negligence, whether he could have foreseen a
particular injury is irrelevant in a strict liability case. In either
negligence or strict liability, once the negligence or the defec-
tive product is shown, the actor is responsible for all of the
unforeseen consequences thereof no matter how remote which
follow in a natural sequence of events.5 3
The foreseeability limitation on strict products liability has been
expressed not only in terms of due care but also in terms of duty, so
that a manufacturer is liable only to those to whom he owes a duty and
thus whose injury he might have foreseen.4 Such an analysis follows
50. Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1973).
51. A series of Oregon cases typify this trend. In Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 256 Or. 199,
472 P.2d 806 (1970), the court held that the test under strict liability is whether a reasonably
prudent manufacturer should have foreseen the hazards of his product if it were distributed with-
out a warning. Id. at -, 472 P.2d at 808. Clearly such a standard is nothing more than a negli-
gence test, giving credence to those who say strict liability has accomplished little in the way of
benefits to the plaintiff. See generally Rheingold, supra note 39. The Oregon Supreme Court
apparently recognized this and overruled Klix Chem. Co. in Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269
Or. 485, -, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974), after having the decision foreshadowed by Roach v.
Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974). Now the Oregon courts impute knowledge of the
danger to the manufacturer. See notes 61-63 infra and accompanying text.
52. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
53. Id. at -, 337 A.2d at 900 (citations omitted). See notes 111-38 infra and accompanying
text.
54. In Winnett v. Winnett, 57 I11. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974), a four-year old girl's fingers were
injured when they were caught in the slow-moving belts of a forage wagon. Such a "use" was held
not foreseeable by the manufacturer. The court spoke in terms of duty and held that
the liability of a manufacturer properly encompasses only those individuals to whom
injury from a defective product may reasonably be foreseen and only those situations
where the product is being used for the purpose for which it was intended or for which it
is reasonably foreseeable that it may be used. Any other approach to the problem results
in making the manufacturer and those in the chain of product distribution virtual insur-
ers of the product. ...
19781
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clearly and directly, albeit erroneously, from the Cardozoan theory of
duty formulated in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.5" It is inappropri-
ate to define strict liability in any terms whatsoever relating to duty. It
is presupposed that often the injury from a dangerous product could
not have been prevented by any known precautions; hence, one would
be forced into the untenable position either of not engaging in the con-
duct at all or of performing the impossible. So stating the law in terms
of duties impossible to perform is extremely unwise. 6 The dissenting
opinion of Justice Andrews in the Palsgraf decision, in which he finds a
duty owed to the whole world when an unreasonable risk of harm is
created by the defendant,57 is infinitely closer to the policy considera-
tions underlying strict liability than is Cardozo's rule of the foreseeable
plaintiff.58 Under both the duty concept of Andrews in negligence and
the public policy considerations of strict liability, a manufacturer
would be liable not only for those persons or property he might have
been expected to injure, but also for those that he does in fact injure.5 9
Id. at -, 3 10 N.E.2d at 4. See also Richelman v. Kewanee Mach. & Conveyor Co., 59 11. App. 3d
578, 375 N.E.2d 885 (1978), reaching the opposite result "upon a set of facts strikingly similar to
the Winneti case." Id. at -, 375 N.E.2d at 889 (dissenting opinion).
55. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See also, Polelle, supra note 42, at 113-19.
56. Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, 30 MIcH. L. REV. 1001, 1014
(1932).
57. 248 N.Y. at -, 162 N.E. at 103.
58. Polelle, supra note 42, characterized the problem:
Emergence of the foreseeability factor in the duty aspect of strict products liability cases
is symptomatic of the doctrinal distress that arises when a legal principle is extended into
new areas that do not fall within its original rationale. To the extent that the foreseeabil-
ity factor of negligence law has entered into the duty analysis of strict products liability
cases, a basic reassessment of the relationship of both torts to the foreseeability concept is
unavoidable.
The danger is that the courts in strict liability cases are being led by the Restatement
(Second) into requiring not only foreseeability, but an extremely high degree of foresee-
ability. While it does not explicitly use the terms "duty" or "foreseeability," the Restate-
ment (Second) limits recovery in strict products liability to those persons who can be
classified either as "consumers" or "users" of the defective product. The failure to pro-
tect persons other than consumers or users was justified on the ground that a consumer
who buys a product has greater reason to rely on the product that non-consumers, and
on the intriguing ground that it was the consumers who brought the social pressure for
the recognition of strict products liability. The drafters of section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) have effectively out-Palsgrafed the Palsgraf doctrine by creating an even
more limited ambit of duty in strict products liability than exists under the flexible duty
test of negligence.
Id. at 116-17 (footnotes omitted). Polelle points out that the circumscribed duty described above
is the source of some dissatisfaction as evidenced by the extention of strict products liability to
bystanders who cannot be classified as users or consumers. Id. at 117. See, e.g., Passwaters v.
General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th. Cir. 1972); Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 463
P.2d 83 (1970); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969).
59. This would apparently include the group of reasonably foreseeable users and consumers
envisioned by the Restatement (Second). In Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974),
older farm workers might have recovered for injuries from the exposed wheels of the conveyor if
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It should be apparent at this point that, in strict liability cases, the
analysis should be of the condition of the product rather than of the
conduct of the defendant, but such has not always been the case.6"
the wheNs were found to be unreasonably dangerous. The mere fact that plaintiff was only four
years old should not have provided the crucial pivotal point upon which liability turned. See
Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 635, 340 N.E.2d 276 (1975), in which the plaintiff
sustained the loss of three fingers while operating a boring and cutting machine. The court found
Winnett "clearly distinguishable" since injury to a four-year old child by a farm forage wagon was
different from injury to an inexperienced or unsupervised adult operator of a dangerous machine!
Id. at -, 340 N.E.2d at 280. See also Court v. Grzelinski, 48 Ill. App. 3d 716, 363 N.E.2d 12
(1977), and Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process--the Insignficance of Foresight,
70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
To compound the problem further, courts have often failed to state whether the foreseeability
test they have applied refers to the defect, the injury, or the plaintiff. That commentators have
exacerbated the confusion is demonstrated in an analysis of Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) found in Elser, Asbestosis
Its Impact Upon Products Liability and Workmen's Compensation, 1975 INs. L.J. 459. Therein,
Elser states:
Referring to the element of foreseeability, the court in Rodin v. American Can
Company [133 Cal. App. 2d 524, 284 P.2d 530 (1955)] set forth the rules common to many
other strict liability cases. The supplier is held liable if he: (1) knew or should have
known that the chattel was likely to be dangerous for the purpose intended, (2) had no
real reason to expect the user would realize the danger, and (3) failed to warn the users of
real or potential danger.
Id. at 464 (emphasis added). He added that the above test and rules for foreseeability are very
similar to the ones used in Borel. However, Rodin was not an "other" strict liability case as the
author indicates; it was tried on a res Opsa loquitur theory of negligence and the court's test (133
Cal. App. at -, 284 P.2d at 532-33) was quoted from the Restatement (Second) § 388, dealing
purely with negligence. Elser is correct in observing that the test is the same as that used in the
Borel strict liability case in which a worker had contracted asbestosis after working more than 30
years as an insulation worker in the defendant's employ. Despite the burden imposed by the
court's use of a straight negligence test of liability, the plaintiff prevailed. The Borelcourt in effect
held that the dangers of asbestosis were foreseeable to the defendants and that they had ignored
them; hence, they were negligent.
This need to establish culpability is out of place. The issues should instead be whether the
condition of the product rendered it dangerous and whether the condition caused the harm. But
see Bassham v. Owens-Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007 (D.N.M. 1971), where the
court found that asbestos was either not defective or, if defective, was not unreasonably danger-
ous, thus absolving the defendant of liability.
60. This focus upon conduct, not condition, is well illustrated by Hagenbuck v. Snap-On
Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972), wherein the plaintiff sued the manufacturer and
distributor of a hammer in strict liability after it chipped while in use and blinded him in one eye.
The court emphasized numerous acts and omissions by the defendant distributor surrounding the
insuring of the safety of the hammers ordered and sold. The defendant had not only distributed
hammers manufactured by others, but also manufactured hammers itself. This dual role gave the
distributor expert knowledge of the flaws and hazards to which the product was susceptible. The
opinion stated:
I find the . . . defendant [seller] negligent in not inspecting and testing the hammers
purchased from [defendant manufacturer], in not insisting that [defendant manufacturer]
meet [defendant seller's] design and testing specifications in the manufacture of its ham-
mers, and in failing to take adequate steps to warn of the danger of chipping.
While [defendant manufacturer's] blind adherence to its time-worn manufacturing
and testing procedures is not condoned, there is no evidence that [defendant manufac-
turer] did not meet the standard ofcare ofthe average hammer manufacturer of reasonable
prudence. There was no testimony as to industry wide practice and custom, and the only
evidence as to industry procedure was limited to what [defendant manufacturer] did and
10
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Further, some courts have taken an approach similar to that of finding
negligenceper se and have imputed knowledge of the product's condi-
tion to the manufacturer.6 Under this approach, which is to some de-
gree a measure of the defendant's conduct, the court will assume that
the danger was foreseeable by the manufacturer and will then ask
whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have marketed the
product anyway.6 2 This does not do away with the negligence test; it
merely injects strict liability with a legal dose of scienter in much the
same fashion as is done in negligence per se. The approach is indeed
closer to strict liability devoid of foreseeability, but it is arrived at
through the use of an unnecessary legal fiction.63
failed to do. I find, therefore, that, under the standard negligence test, [defendant manu-
facturer] is not liable.
Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
The court was candid in demonstrating that, although it was a strict liability case, liability
was to be assessed along pure negligence lines. It would appear from the facts that, had a strict
liability test focused upon the condition of the product rather than the conduct of the parties, the
defendant manufacturer would have been liable for placing a defective hammer which was unusu-
ally dangerous into the marketplace.
The court also transplanted another negligence concept into the garden of strict liabil-
ity-that of comparative negligence. Here, the court found the plaintiff'20% negligent in using the
hammer after it had chipped previously. Id. at 680. When strict products liability cases are subju-
gated to pure negligence tests, it is not surprising that additional negligence concepts fail to stand
out on the legal landscape as clearly inappropriate. Once evaluations of conduct are thrown into
the equation, the examination again becomes one of negligence rather than of strict liability based
on the product's condition. See also notes 154-64 infra and accompanying text.
61. See note 51 supra.
62. See Phillips v. Kirnwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974):
The law imputes to a manufacturer [or supplier] knowledge of the harmful charac-
ter of his product whether he actually knows of it or not. He is presumed to know of the
harmful characteristics of that which he makes [or supplies]. Therefore, a product is
dangerously defective if it is so harmful to persons [or property] that a reasonably pru-
dent manufacturer [or supplier] with this knowledge would not have placed it on the
market.
Id. at -, 525 P.2d at 1040 n.16 (quoting Professor Wade with alterations by the court). See also
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, -, 386 A.2d 816, 821 (1978).
63. Following the Kimwood test of imputed foreseeability, supra note 51, the Oregon
Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132 (1976) observed that:
Foreseeability is a negligence concept; a standard for assessing culpability. As such,
it is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a manufacturer should
be held liable without fault. If, however, we assume foreseeability of the danger and ask
only whether it would be reasonable to market the product in that condition with full
knowledge of the risks involved, then that inquiry will reflect the proper focus of the law
of products liability and center on the condition of the product, rather than on the culpa-
bility of the particular manufacturer.
Id. at-, 547 P.2d at 142 n.12. See also the special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Holman in
which he explains that foreseeability has no place in strict products liability. It is presumed and,
therefore, removed from consideration by the jury. To allow any jury instruction as to foresee-
ability, he correctly noted, is to revert to a negligence test for liability. 1d. at -, 547 P.2d at 144
(concurring opinion).
One important limitation on the imputed knowledge test is that it is limited to those risks
which were in some measure knowable at the time of marketing rather than those known to be
hazardous at the time of trial. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, -, 525 P.2d 1033,
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IV. KNOWABLE VERSUS UNKNOWABLE RISKS
Foreseeability has been the basis of limiting the liability of suppli-
ers and manufacturers for dangers which were both unknown and un-
knowable at the time of marketing.64 A finding of nonliability in such
situations has also been based on the premise that holding a manufac-
turer strictly liable in the case of unknowable hazards might unnecessa-
rily discourage the development and the marketing of new and useful
products which might initially have unforetold detrimental conse-
quences." This, however, does not necessarily follow since the risk al-
location doctrine merely shifts the burden of resulting injuries from the
victim to the producer. If the product is indeed useful, it will pay its
way in the marketplace as do many other useful but occasionally dan-
gerous products. If the product's utility does not outweigh its hazard, it
will quickly and deservingly be eliminated through economic interac-
tions.66
1036-37 (1974). See generally Vetri, Products Liability.- The Developing Frameworkfor Analysis, 54
OR. L. REV. 293 (1975). Such a time limitation is arguably meaningless where imputed, and not
actual, knowledge is the requirement. It should make no conceptual difference whether the time
of marketing or the time of trial is chosen for the imputation of such knowledge. See generally
Keeton, Products Liabilio--Inadequac of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 404 (1970); Wade,
supra note 6, at 14; notes 64-79 infra and accompanying text.
64. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying Missouri law), denied
recovery because the state of scientific or medical knowledge was such that the harm was unfor-
seeable; to impose liability "would have made the defendant an absolute insurer-without regard
to 'reasonableness' and without regard to 'developed human skill and foresight.'" Id. at 12, quot-
ing language similar to that found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402A, comment
j, at 353. Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865
(1963), held that a manufacturer "is an insurer against foreseeable risks-not unknowable risks."
Id. at 37. For a similar result in pure negligence, as opposed to the foregoing warranty cases, see
Livesley v. Continental Motor Works, 331 Mich. 434, 49 N.W.2d 365 (195 1) where apparently no
means were available to the defendant which would have allowed him to discover the presence of
inclusion pits in a connecting rod. The rod had failed, causing the crash of a light plane. A
similar analysis has been carried over erroneously into strict liability based upon the foreseeability
doctrine.
65. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 71 YALE
L.J. 816 (1962).
66. White, Strict Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers andAssumption 0/Risk, 29 LA. L. REV.
589 (1969). White discusses the cigarette industry, which arguably markets a product with no
social utility whatsoever. The ultimate, unavoidable effect of the operations of the industry is
"mass destruction of life" 'where the "'norm is danger:" White, not wishing to advocate the
abolition of the industry, writes:
We survived the passing of the buggy whip industry, a valid one in its day, and I am sure
we can survive the passing of many more when they outlive their social usefulness. Pro-
hibition of the manufacture of cigarettes, their sale or smoking is not proposed-it is
proposed only that the cigarette manufacturing industry pay the inevitable, and thus
intentional [one intends the consequences which are substantially certain to follow from
his actions] cost of its present system of operations. If it cannot do that and survive, it
has no basis on which to claim a right to stay.
Id. at 618-19. The commentator draws an interesting analogy from Commonwealth v. Feinberg,
211 Pa. Super. Ct.,100,'234 A.2d913(1967), a'd,433 Pa. 558, 253 A.2d 636 (1969), in which a skid-
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There is a difference, conceptually at least, between an unknown
danger which tests would have revealed (although the need for the tests
was perhaps not recognized)67 and hazards which science and technol-
ogy are not able to detect even though their harmful potential is real-
ized, such as serum hepatitis contamination in blood transfusions.
Perhaps Green v. American Tobacco Co.68 set the stage for finding de-
fendants liable for unknowable defects. Although the case was tried
under the narrower principles of implied warranty rather than strict
liability, the court nevertheless reasoned that "[n]o reasonable distinc-
tion can. . . be made between the physical or practical impossibility of
obtaining knowledge of a dangerous condition, and scientific inability
resulting from a current lack of human knowledge and skill. ' '69
Among the hepatitis cases, Cunningham v. MacNeal Hospital,70
though not without criticism,7 stands as a landmark case in recogniz-
row store owner sold cans containing a high percentage of methyl alcohol, in a solidified state,
marked: "Institutional Sterno. Danger. Poison; not for home use. For commercial and industrial
use only." The store owner sold this product to residents of the area without calling attention to
the label or warning of the danger. Its use resulted in deaths, and defendant store owner was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter. White quotes the court in affirming the conviction:
In light of the recognized weaknesses of the purchasers of the product, and appellants
greater concern for profit than with the results of his action, he was grossly negligent and
demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard for the welfare of those whom he might
reasonably have expected to use the product for drinking purposes.
Id. at 616-17.
67. In Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949), defendant had
marketed a new chemical designed to be sprayed on crops from an airplane. When it was found
that the chemical had a greater tendency to drift than similar sprays, defendant was imputed to
have that knowledge which tests would have revealed and was held liable for damage done to
foliage in fields ajoining the one being sprayed.
We do not think the Chemical Company excused itself from liability by the mere
showing that it was unaware of the peculiar carrying quality of the dust it was selling.
Ordinary care required that it should have known in view of the dangerous nature of the
product it was selling, and it was charged with the knowledge which tests would have
revealed. The case is therefore one in which the rule of strict liability should be applied.
Id. at -, 222 S.W.2d at 827. But while the test appears to be similar to that applied by the Oregon
Supreme Court, see notes 63-65 supra, in strict liability, actually the court here appeared to find
liability because the chemical company was negligent in its testing. Mr. Justice Smith dissented
from the opinion saying:
I find no reason for bringing into our law the principle of absolute liability. Experience
elsewhere has shown that this doctrine is hard to confine, once its existence has been
recognized. We shall be asked to extend the scope of this case in the future, and I can
hardly see the point at which its application may logically be said to end.
Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, -, 222 S.W.2d 820, 828 (1949).
68. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
69. Id. at 171.
70. 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1972).
71. See, e.g., Heirs ofFruge v. Blood Serv., 365 F. Supp. 1344 (W.D. La. 1973), mod#7ed, 506
F.2d 841 (1975); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (Div. 1974), aft'd, 66
N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075, cert.
denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974); Note, Strict Liability for Disease Contractedfromn
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ing the proper policy purposes of strict liability. That case held that,
where a product was unreasonably dangerous, 72 the fact that its danger
could not have been detected did not excuse the supplier from liability
therefor. The court in Cunningham correctly reasoned that to allow a
defendant to escape liability because the impurities of a product were
unknown, either practically or theoretically, would emasculate strict li-
ability in favor of a return to negligence theories.73 Other courts have
echoed this conclusion and have held that some products are so dan-
gerous that the manufacturer, even though he did not know and could
not have known of the danger at the time of marketing, should be held
liable for the resulting harm.74 The proper rule was well stated in the
recent case of General Motors v. Hopkins.75 There it was recognized
that a manufacturer's liability is not rested upon what he knew or
should have known when he manufactured and sold the product.
Rather it rests upon the very fact that he placed a dangerous instru-
mentality into the stream of commerce.76 "The damaging event may
not have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of manufacture or
sale because the dangerous factor of the product might not then have
even been knowable. 77 Hence, even though the supplier or manufac-
turer is free of culpability, a price of doing business is the protection of
the public from the menace of his products.78
V. THE STATE OF THE ART DEFENSE
A manufacturer has traditionally been protected from negligence
liability by the state of the art defense for product defects which were
ostensibly unknowable. This defense allowed a supplier to be absolved
from all liability for harm which resulted if the means of making the
Blood Transfusion, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 80, 88-90 (1971); Note, Liabilityfor Serum Hepatitis in Blood
Transfusions, 32 OHIO S.L.J. 585, 597-98 (1971).
72. In 1970, it was estimated that 92,000 people contracted acute viral hepatitis via blood
transfusions, with one-third of the cases termed severe. Further, 3,700 deaths in that year were
attributable to this form of disease transfer. The resulting economic impact for this group of
hepatitis victims alone in that year was estimated at $40,900,000 in medical costs and $210,200,000
in productivity loss. Tolsma & Bryan, The Economic Impact of Viral Hepatitis in the United
States, 91 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 349 (1976).
73. Cunningham v. MacNeal Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d443, -, 266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (1972). See also
Melnick, Dreesman & Hollinger, ViralHepatitis, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN July, 1977, at 44, indicat-
ing there may soon be a vaccine against hepatitis B, the major strain troublesome in blood trans-
fusions.
74. See, e.g., Crocker v. Winthrop Laborator s, 514 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1974).
75. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977),
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offending article safe-or safer-were beyond the state of the scientific
or industrial art at the time the article was marketed. In other words,
the manufacturer was protected if he had exercised due care.79 Fur-
ther, it has been held that a manufacturer is under no duty to adopt
every new safety device or procedure available.8" But this is to con-
tinue to approach strict liability on a plane of negligence in which duty
and due care are very much a part. Moreover, strict liability does not
require that industry adopt new safety practices; it only requires that
industry pay for the damage its products cause rather than shift the
burden of that risk to consumers. This, in fact, has been true even
under the state of the art defense: industry-wide practices ("custom")
were never conclusive where the exercise of due care was in question,
and the test was often dealt with somewhat in the abstract.8 '
The elimination of the state of the art defense in strict products
liability might at first blush seem almost heretical in that a manufac-
turer is thus constantly being held to a future standard. But to preserve
the defense would be a return to a negligence standard, and this is be-
ing recognized increasingly by the courts.8 2 The policy considerations
79. That this reasoning is carried over into the strict liability arena by some courts is seen in
the case of Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974). Although discussing
an action under the Restatement (Second) § 402A, the court repeatedly referred to the scope of
negligence and the exercise of reasonable care as standards therein and held that there is "no duty
upon the manufacturer to adopt every possible new device which has been conceived or invented"
and further, that "[n]egligence cannot be proved because there is a better way later demonstrated."
Id. at 835, citing Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187, 192 (D.C. La. 1969). The latter
authority, however, was purely a negligence action. See also Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544
F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976); Raleigh, The "State of the Art"in Products Liabiliy."A New Look at
an Old Defense, 4 OHio N.L. REv. 249 (1977).
80. Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832, 835 (Vyo. 1974).
81. Bordorek v. General Motors Corp., II Cal. App. 3d 902, 935, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 327
(1970). See also The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, cert. denied, sub norn. Eastern Transp. Co. v.
Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932): "Courts must in the end say what is required; there
are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission."
60 F.2d at 740.
82. In Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Il. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973), plaintiffs
employer purchased a punch press from the defendant. The machine could be operated in either
of two ways: by hand buttons on each side of the machine or by a partially guarded foot pedal,
The plaintiff, while operating the machine, slipped on oil which was on the floor and fell against
the machine. His foot struck the pedal on its unguarded side; this activated the machine which
severely injured the plaintiff's hand which had entered the die portion of the machine as he fell.
At trial, in an action based on strict liability, defendant was granted summary judgement. The
court held that the punch press was not unreasonably dangerous and that it conformed to the state
of the art for the industry at the time of sale.
The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the decision and remanded the case for trial. That
court chose to follow the lead of Cunningham v. MacNeal Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1972), see notes 71-80 supra and accompanying text, and held that whether the foot pedal was
unreasonably dangerous was a material question for the jury since "the state of the art defense is
not a defense to a claim involving an unreasonably dangerous product" in strict liability. 47 Il. 2d
at -, 295 N.E.2d at 113. But additionally, the court noted that the accident was foreseeable since
15
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for eliminating the defense involve both risk allocation and safety in-
centives. Had the use of thalidomide, for instance, found its way to
markets in the United States at the same time that it did in other parts
of the world, its disasterous effects would have been both unknown and
unforeseeable. 3 When such a product does, in fact, visit devastation
upon its users, the policy considerations underlying strict liability re-
quire that the responsibility for injuries should fall upon those who
placed the outrageously dangerous product into the stream of com-
merce. The drug industry, through its profits, is more able to cope with
the tragic losses than are innocent victims of the substance.
Secondarily, there is the question of incentives for safety. It may
well be asked what safety incentive could result from imposing liability
on a manufacturer who could not possibly have known of the danger
and the consequent need to guard against it. The answer, simply
stated, is that limiting liability to foreseeable harm is stating the issue in
the negative: no liability for unknown or unknowable danger. Con-
versely, requiring that the manufacturer know that his product is safe is
an affirmative notion. Fulfilling that requirement would entail either
more extensive research and testing, thereby conclusively proving the
product's safety, or having the seller shoulder the risks involved and
pay for his product's damage accordingly. It goes without saying that
some dangers at any given point in time will be unknown or undetect-
able. But foreseeability as a limitation or liability arguably has the ef-
fect of retarding research and development of products.8 4 If the hazard
is unknowable due to the current state of industry research, liability is
avoided. The incentive to know that a product is safe carries with it the
possibility that research will produce evidence of heretofore unknown
or unforeseeable harm which thereafter may make that industry liable,
the foot pedal was partially guarded and that, therefore, the state of the art defense does not apply
to foreseeable harm. Id.
83. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1962, at 39, col. 8.
84. As has been pointed out:
what is feasible often depends upon the industry's research efforts because it alone has
the knowledge and experience peculiar to its field. The extent of industrial research and
development eventually determines the state of the art, and this effort, motivated prima-
rily by profit, may retard possible advancement in safety design. Extending liability in
such circumstances, however, may make it more profitable to install safety devices rather
than compensate for injuries. In contrast, the Cunningham court viewed the imposition
of strict liability as a vehicle for economic risk distribution, recognizing that the manu-
facturer is in a superior position to purchase insurance and spread the cost. But produc-
ers will do more than merely insure; they will be forced to improve their products where
improvement is economically and technologically feasible.
Recent Developments, Products Liabiliy--Strict Liability-Eimination of the "State of the Art"
Defense, 41 TENN. L. REv. 357, 363 (1974).
19781
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even under negligence standards, once the foreseeability of the harm is
evidenced.
Thus the realm of the unknown provides a haven for unsafe prod-
ucts. Rather, the law should prescribe that, if a product is to enter the
stream of commerce, the producer must affirmatively know of its safety
or assume the risk if it is unsafe.85 To return to the drug industry, for
example, further research demonstrated the horrible dangers of
thalidomide. It is regretable that such research was carried on in the
marketplace with the resulting carnage which, in all likelihood, could
have been avoided through the requirement of affirmative knowledge
of the product's safety. In fact, it was a fortuitous call for further test-
ing that prevented thalidomide from reaching the American market.
Absolute safety,86 of course, is a myth and would not be required
under this analysis. However, the affirmative knowledge requirement
would inject a much stronger element of encouragement for safety re-
search.87 Such a requirement would also place the risk and resulting
85. It is interesting to note that the Restatement (Second)
would extend [immunity] even to manufacturers of many drugs of uniform quality, if
their usefulness appears to outweigh the known dangers that attend their use. Thus, ill
health offers an adventure; no one has a better chance to live dangerously than the ill
who must take their medicine.
If a product is so dangerous as to inflict widespread harm, it is ironic to exempt the
manufacturer from liability on the ground that any other sample of the product would
produce like harm. If we scrutinize deviations from a norm of safety as a basis for im-
posing liability, should we not scrutinize all the more the product whose norm is danger?
Traynor, supra note 26, at 368 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, it has been observed:
That the Restatement (Second)) [comment k] formulation of the unreasonably dan-
gerous requirement is an implied invitation to return to negligence law by means of a
foreseeability risk analysis is confirmed by its further dictate that products which are
unavoidably unsafe because of inadequate technical knowledge do not subject the de-
fendant to strict liability. . . . [Tlhe Restatement (Second) has relegated the unavoid-
ably unsafe product to a negligence risk analysis and its concomitant concepts of
foreseeability and fault. For how does one determine whether a product is "properly"
marketed or a "proper" warning is attached except by determining what a reasonable
person of ordinary prudence would do in the light of his foresight under the circum-
stances.
Polelle, supra note 42, at I I.
86. A related issue is relative safety. "The purchaser of a Volkswagon cannot expect the
same degree of safety as would the buyer of the much more expensive Cadillac. It must be borne
in mind that we are dealing with a relative, not absolute, concept." Seattle First Nat'l Bank v.
Tabert, 86 Wash. 145, -, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975). But this is perhaps more properly reserved for
discussion in assumption of risk. See notes 174-202 infra and accompanying text.
87. The question of the impact of products liability suits upon manufacturers is often more a
matter of assumption than of demonstration. A provocative footnote in Vetri, supra note 63, is
deemed important enough to be reproduced here in full.
The National Commission on Product Safety commissioned law professor William
Whitford to do an empirical study "to assess the impact of product liability litigation on
the decisions of manufacturers regarding the design of their products and the content of
17
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costs of injury on that entity which is most able to absorb and distribute
the warnings issued about dangers connected with their products' use." "The circum-
stancial evidence uncovered in this project," wrote Whitford, "together with what direct
evidence there is, suggests that products liability litigation usually has little direct impact
on product design or warning decisions." The evidence supporting this conclusion was
of three types, said Whitford: "First, in many of the cases studied, the time period be-
tween the occurence of the injury and the final outcome of the litigation exceeds 5 years,
and in almost every case the time period exceeds 2 years. The design of many products
is changed periodically for reasons unconnected with safety, and when these products
are involved in litigation, the court is usually asked to determine whether a design no
longer in use was sufficiently safe." Second, although manufacturers probably interest
themselves in product liability litigation more than, say, motorists, nonetheless "a
number of. . .manufacturers. . . indicated that their insurers handle all products lia-
bility claims. In some instances, the manufacturers apparently do not even inform them-
selves of the final resolution of the claims, and for these manufacturers it is obvious that
a court decision will have no direct effect on product design or warning decisions. A
manufacturer who intended to take account of litigation results would be likely to exert
more control over the claim settling process since the other interests that enter into de-
sign decisions could be undesirably affected by an adverse outcome."
Finally, a majority of the rotary mower manufacturers who replied responsively [to
this survey] indicated that they did not routinely keep track of litigation involving other
manufacturers. A manufacturer taking account of products liability litigation in its de-
sign decisions would logically inform himself of the outcome of litigation involving man-
ufacturers of similar products, particularly in an industry in which there has been so
much litigation.
Professor Whitford's report can be found in "Products Liability," in Supplemental
Studies, 3 Products Safety Law and Administration: Federal, State, Local & Common
Law 221 (1970).
Moreover, products liability insurers have not been actively involved in encouraging
manufacturers to develop safer products:
"Until recently, the insurance industry has not been assiduous in encouraging man-
ufacturers of consumer products to reduce unreasonable hazards. It studies the records
of individual products or firms mainly to decide how much coverage to grant and what
premium to charge. Product liability insurance and payments typically cost the manu-
facturer less than 0.05 percent of sales. They cover only a few percent of the medical cost
of injuries.
"According to Professor Herbert S. Denenberg of the University of Pennsylvania's
Wharton School, three 'blue chip' insurers concede that they have done little to analyze
their files in order to synthesize principles of product safety to guide their decisions, to
enlighten their clients, or to protect the consumer. Two, however, claimed such pro-
grams were under consideration. Few of the companies studied by Denenberg could cite
examples of their success in preventing losses from unreasonably hazardous products.
"A leading expert on casualty insurance, Clarence A. KuIp, wrote: 'There is. . . no
automatic connection between a scheme for loss payment and loss prevention. Insur-
ance, even under public auspices, is still a device to distribute the costs of the Hazard.'
"Professor Denenberg calls it 'an act of gross social irresponsibility' to permit insur-
ance companies to acquire this expertise in saving life and limb and then utilize this
information only for the purpose of estimating the cost of, but not preventing, injury.
Representatives of the insurance industry said their companies engage in substantial loss
prevention efforts, but offered little data and few specific examples in rebuttal. Our sur-
vey of manufacturers found that few received counsel on product safety from insurers. A
consultant suggested that few insurers are able to retain engineers as qualified as the
manufacturer to evaluate the safety of his product.
"Even if insurance companies, through loss prevention efforts, do work aggressively
to reduce product hazards, they cannot enforce safety standards upon manufacturers
who do not wish to buy their insurance. At the same time, it is not clear that safety
necessarily would be improved by a law which required manufacturers of consumer
products to be insured." National Comm'n On Product Safety, Final Report 70-71
(1970). The Commission's Final Report is reproduced as an appendix to 4 Frumer &
Friedman, Products Liability (1974).
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss2/3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:338
those costs and which is responsible for that injury in the final analy-
sis. 88
In products liability cases based upon negligence, the state of the
art defense was indeed relevant because it was regarded as proof that
the defendant had exercised all possible care in the production and dis-
tribution of its product. In strict liability, however, all possible care
does not excuse a defendant. Hence, as some courts have already rec-
ognized, the state of the art defense is of no import in strict products
liability.8
9
VI. FORESEEABILITY-THE DUTY TO WARN
The application of the foreseeability doctrine is also clearly found
in the frequently imposed requirement that a seller give adequate
warning of any hazards of his product, in order to prevent the product's
being found to be unreasonably dangerous.90 The requirement applies
To this very discouraging information must be added the economic reality that, if
accident costs are a small percentage of the sales dollar, it is not likely that they will
exercise much deterrent effect or provide a safety incentive.
Id. at 299-301 n.35 (some citations omitted).
88. It has been said that, since under negligence principles manufacturers who fail to use the
latest safety techniques will be held negligent and liable, "one is forced to wonder what further
could be accomplished under a system of strict liability." Comment, Implied Warranties-The
Pripity Rule andStrict Liability-The Non-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L. REV. 194, 208 (1962). Obviously
the answer is liability for nonnegligent danger resulting in injury not absolved through an appro-
priate defense. See notes 139-222 infra and accompanying text. See also Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963):
There exists we think, no valid objection to this distribution of the burden if the public
health is to be protected in any practical sense from exploitation by those who, for a
profit motive, undertake to supply the vast and ever increasing variety of products which
the people by unprecedented powers of commercial persuasion are daily urged to use
and consume.
Id. at 173. See also Karasik, State of the Art or Science.: Is It a Defense to Products Liability?, 60
ILL. B.J. 348 (1972).
89. See, e.g., Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
978 (1974); Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc.,
34 II. App. 3d 635, 340 N.E.2d 276 (1975).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402A comment j:
Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as
to its use. The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for
example to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn
against them. Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial
number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not
generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to
find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge,
or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have
knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger. [The foregoing appears
essentially as a negligence standard]. Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or those
unduly dangerous for other reasons, warning as to use may be required.
But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them,
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only to known or knowable harm, moreover, in contravention of the
considerations outlined above.9' Courts have applied section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts92 and have concluded that, while
manufacturers are not insurers, they are liable for a product's unrea-
sonable danger. These courts have employed a balancing test to deter-
mine whether the danger is outweighed by the product's utility. One
court went so far as to proclaim: "The fulcrum for the balancing proc-
ess is the reasonable man as consumer or seller."'93 This is clearly noth-
ing more than a negligence standard of reasonable care based upon the
mythical reasonable person, coupled with a duty to warn of foreseeable
dangers. The same court applied comment k of section 402A and
found that, even though the utility of the product outweighed the risk,
failure to warn adequately would render the product unreasonably
dangerous. 94 As has been pointed out, this is a simple negligence anal-
ysis: once the dangers of the product becomes known through devel-
oped skill or foresight,95 the duty to warn attaches. 96 Resorting to the
concepts of foreseeability, duty to warn, and breach of duty in a strict
liability action has returned the court to the arena of negligence (albeit
at the invitation of the Restatement (Second)). It is therefore difficult to
imagine a court's reaching a different result under an action for negli-
gence as distinguished from a strict products liability action.
For purposes of strict liability, the warning, or lack thereof, con-
cerning the dangers of a given product should refer more properly to
informed consent and assumption of risk.97 Nevertheless, a long line of
which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive quantity, or
over a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally
known and recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an example, as are
also those of foods containing such substances as saturated fats, which may over a period
of time have a deleterious effect upon the human heart.
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and
heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is
not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
91. Id.
92. See note 17 supra.
93. Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
94. 493 F.2d at 1088-89.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, comment j. See note 93 supra.
96. Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1093 (5th Cir. 1973), cer. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
97. See notes 139-222 infra and accompanying text. In Borel, the court held that assumption
of risk did not apply because the plaintiff lacked the knowledge to appreciate the degree of
harm-plaintiff knew asbestos was unhealthy but did not know it could kill. Before it was over-
ruled by Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485,-, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974), Anderson v.
Klix Chem. Co., 256 Or. 199, 472 P.2d 806 (1970), stood for the traditional approach to duty to
warn in strict liability:
"Logically, failure to warn (effectively) conceptually resembles negligence, not strict lia-
1978]
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cases has followed the rule articulated in Campo v. Scofle/d 9" that there
is no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers. This rule has been
much criticized99 and was recently disavowed in the state which
adopted it.' Those courts which have followed the rule reasoned that
there is no duty to warn of a patently obvious danger since nothing of
value is gained thereby.' 0' But there are instances in which an open
and obvious danger, even if it had been warned of, should not absolve
the defendant from liability.' 0 2  The proper focus of strict liability
should not be upon the defendant's conduct but rather upon the nature
bility.". . .This aspect of "strict liability," failure to warn of the dangers of an otherwise
nondefective product, does revert to a negligence basis for liability. The basic questions
are whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer that the product would be
unreasonably dangerous if distributed without a warning on the label and, if so, whether
the manufacturer supplied the warning that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would
have supplied.
Id. at -, 472 P.2d at 808. To apply the foregoing test in strict liability/duty to warn cases is to
eviscerate the doctrine of strict liability.
98. 301 N.Y. 468, -, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950).
99. See, e.g., Pike v. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
100. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976). See
also Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right-" Manufacturers' Liabilityfor Patently
Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1065 (1973).
101. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 26-29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fanning v.
LaMay, 38 Ill. 2d 209, -, 230 N.E.2d 182, 185 (1967).
102. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
iTihe policy underlying the doctrine of strict liability compels the conclusion that recov-
ery should not be limited to cases involving latent defects .... Requiring the defect to
be latent would severely limit the cases in which the financial burden would be shifted to
the manufacturer. It would indeed be anomalous to allow a plaintiff to prove that a
manufacturer was negligent in marketing an obviously defective product, but to preclude
him from establishing the manufacturer's strict liability for doing the same thing. The
result would be immunize from strict liability manufacturers who callously ignore patent
dangers in their products while subjecting to such liability those who innocently market
products with latent defects.
Id. at 145, 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449. See also Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60
Cal. App. 3d 533, 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 616 (1976). But see Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263
Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (197 1) (where plaintiff's hand entered a lubrication hole on a paper bailing
machine when plaintiff slipped and fell, the defect was termed patent and plaintiff was denied
recovery).
Allergies pose more difficult questions than the summary treatment of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) comment j, see note 90 supra, indicates. The Restatement excuses liability for allergic reac-
tions unless the victim is a member of a large, foreseeable class so afflicted. In Mountain v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1970), a strict liability action against the
makers of Head and Shoulders shampoo, plaintiff sued to recover damages from substantial inju-
ries suffered following an allergic reaction to the defendant's product. The opinion, heavily laced
with negligence analysis, finds, inter alia, that the company was not negligent in testing its product
and was not under a duty to warn due to the small number of expected reactions. When the court
found no breach of duty and therefore no negligence, it dismissed the plaintiff's action. A more
recent case, however, held that the "failure to warn of a danger cannot always be excused by the
mere fact that the potentially endangered users are few in number." Crocker v. Winthrop Labora-
tories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1974), disapproving Cudmore v. Richard-Merrell, Inc., 398
S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967) and Alberto-Culver Co. v.
Morgan, 444 S.W.2d 770 (rex. Ct. App. 1969). See also Whitmore, Allergies and Other Reactions
Due to Drugs and Cosmetics, 19 Sw. L.J. 76 (1965).
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of the product. Failure to warn adequately is then correctly seen as a
negligence concept relating to the sufficiency of the defendant's conduct
and to his actions as a reasonably prudent manufacturer or supplier. A
supplier in strict liability should not be viewed as fulfilling or breaching
a duty to the plaintiff vis-k-vis the presence or absence of warnings.
Rather a warning may serve to remove liability from the supplier by
conveying such information as will make a user or consumer fully and
subjectively cognizant of the danger involved. The question then be-
comes whether the plaintiff's conduct amounted to assumption of
risk. 103
Foreseeability has long been entwined with duty to warn in actions
for negligence, 1' and the cases indicate the extreme malleability of the
foreseeability doctrine in regard to the supplier's predictive skills. It
has been held that manufacturers should have foreseen that directions
would not be followed in using a tree spray;" 5 that a user of a chest
ointment would smoke and drop a match into his pajamas, igniting the
trapped fumes of the ointment; 0 6 and that a child of six years would
spray highly flammable hairspray on her dress and hair.0 7 Yet is was
not deemed foreseeable that a rubber exercising rope which was
designed to be held under the feet while being stretched would slip off
and snap into the plaintiff's eye'0 8 or that a housewife would splash
cleaning fluid into her eye. 10 9 Continuation of this sort of analysis in
strict liability is not only improper but counterproductive. Since the
issue of negligence need not be decided, inquiry into foreseeability and
breach of duty to warn is mere surplusage and should be disregarded.
VII. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Because perhaps no other area of the law is subject to as much
disagreement and to as many attempts at clarification as is the issue of
proximate causation,"1 0 it is with reluctance that the problem is raised
here. However, addressing it is unavoidable in a discussion of foresee-
103. See notes 139-222 infra and accompanying text.
104. See generally Comment, Foreseeability in Product Design and Duly to Warn Cases- Dis-
tinctions and Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 228.
105. McClanahan v. California-Spray Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953).
106. Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
107. Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus. Inc., 48 111. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964).
108. Jaimeson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
109. Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946), contra, Haberly v. Reardon
Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
110. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 n.1 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinaf-
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ability since the latter has long been employed as a test for proximate
cause, although other approaches such as substantial factor or sequen-
tial causation have also found favor.
The Restatement (Second) is notable in that it requires only actual
causation-not proximate causation-under section 402A. t 1t  A
number of cases have nevertheless included it as a proper element of
strict liability." 2 Others have reasoned that the same principles which
apply to causation in negligence should apply in strict liability.' 13 The
attitude toward proximate cause is perhaps typified by the strict liabil-
ity action of Gelsumio v. E. W Bliss Co.11 4 in which the court employed
a heavy dose of negligence language to hold: "Proximate cause is essen-
tially a question of foreseeability and, for plaintiff to recover, his injury
must be the natural and probable result of a negligent act and be of
such nature that an ordinarily prudent person should have foreseen as
likely to result.""'
Perhaps because of the confusion and dissatisfaction associated
with the foreseeability test for proximate cause, courts have increas-
ingly called for a producing cause 16 or for a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the injury i7 as the proper test for proximate cause.
Foreseeability is more suitably a test of negligence rather than of proxi-
mate cause."t 8 The better rule, in order to eliminate the foresight test of
negligence's reasonably prudent person, would be the adoption of se-
quential causation.' 19 As an example, if a tank truck hauling gasoline,
I 11. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402A(1), at 348. Maleson, Negli.
gence is Dead but its Doctrines Rule Usfrom the Grave. A Proposal to Limit Defendant's Responsl.
bility in Strict Products Liability Actions without Resort to Proximate Cause, 51 TEMP. L.Q. I
(1978).
112. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. Stewart, 465 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1061 (1972); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). The "mother mink" cases were
early applications of this limitation despite the ultrahazardous activity of blasting. See, e.g.,
Gronn v. Rogers Constr. Co., 221 Or. 226, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960); Madsen v. East Jordan Irr. Co.,
101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942); Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645
(1954). For the proximate cause limitation in an unusual or "far-fetched" situation, there is Papa-
relli v. General Motors Corp., 179 N.W.2d 263 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
113. See, e.g., Oehler v. Davis, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 333, -, 298 A.2d 895, 895-96 (1972).
114. 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973).
115. Id. at -, 295 N.E.2d at 112 (citation omitted). See also Guarino v. Mine Safety Appli-
ance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Ct. App. 1969).
116. Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 532, 533 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
117. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,469-70
(1973) (but with the limitations of intended use and reasonable care imposed on the plaintiff).
118. Hoover v. Sackett, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, -, 292 A.2d 461, 463 (1972).
119. The court in Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Co., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) rea-
soned that.
[b]ecause the seller is liable in strict liability regardless of any negligence, whether he
could have foreseen a particular injury is irrelevant in a strict liability case. In either
[Vol. 14:338
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which has been held to be an ultrahazardous activity, 20 overturned
and discharged its contents which then seeped into the soil and were
carried by subterranian waters to a trout farm pond less than three
miles away killing fish therein, such a result might be deemed unfore-
seeable.' 2 1 Under the sequential theory of causation, however, since
the unbroken chain of events resulted in injury or damage, causation is
established.
It has been postulated that where, as in strict liability, there has
been neither intentional harm nor negligence, the limits of liability
are-or should be--drawn at or within the foreseeable risk, purport-
edly basing such a limitation upon the policy which supports the liabil-
ity.122 This postulate is invalid, however, since limitations based on
foreseeable consequences reintroduce negligence considerations
counterproductive to public policy in strict liability. 23  Therefore,
courts have begun to rule that a plaintiff must show only that the defect
was a producing cause of his injuries, with no showing of proximate
cause required.' 24 The implementation of the test of sequential causa-
tion described above extends the ambit of strict products liability law to
its proper dimensions.
Inherent in any discussion of proximate cause is the issue of inter-
vening, superseding causation whereby, under a negligence theory at
least, a wrong-doer is relieved of liability when the chain of causation is
broken by an unforeseeable act or consequence. 25 In negligence, one
negligence or strict liability, once the negligence or defective product is shown, the actor
is responsible for all the unforeseen consequences thereof no matter how remote, which
follow in a natural sequence of events.
Id. at -, 337 A.2d at 900.
120. Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983
(1973).
121. Such was the result in a negligence cause of action. See Ozark Indus., Inc. v. Stubbs
Transports, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 351 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
122. W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 79, at 517.
123. Polelle, supra note 42, at 124-25, writes:
A simpler and more coherent causation test for strict products liability would abandon
the foreseeability fiction entirely in favor of a pure, sequential version of causation.
The risk allocation theory of strict products liability will produce the same compensatory
result of sequential causation that has been achieved in the doctrine of trespass law and
will permit the evolution of causation doctrine in strict products liability cases along the
theoretical lines that are internally consistent with the tort itself.
124. Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Ct. App.
1974). See also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][d] (1978): "A man-
ufacturer of a defective product is responsible for all the unforeseen consequences thereof, no
matter how remote, which follow in a natural sequence of events." Craig v. Burch, 228 So. 2d 723,
writ refd, 255 La. App. 475, 231 So. 2d 393 (1970). Contra, Vinogradov v. Clicquot Club Co., 55
App. Div. 2d 489, 391 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1977).
125. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 44, at 270-89.
1978]
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who fails to anticipate an unforeseeable circumstantial addition to a
given situation which results in injury is not necessarily liable for the
injury. There may be an unforeseeable intervening cause which has an
unforeseeable result for which the defendant will not be liable. This is
because he is not negligent 26 with regard to the ultimate result.
27
Conversely there may be a foreseeable result arising out of an unfore-
seeable cause 128 for which the defendant may be found to be negligent
because that result was within the purview of a reasonable person.'
29
The test is basically a risk foreseeability analysis which may relieve an
otherwise negligent actor if the injury is found to lie outside the risk
which a reasonable person should have anticipated. 130
Problems arise, however, when this intervening cause concept is
transplanted from its native soil of negligence to the field of strict liabil-
ity. Reverting to the negligence test of intervening causation in strict
liability is inappropriate both logically and from the standpoint of the
risk allocation policy underlying strict liability. As will be seen, inter-
vening causation frequently finds its way into strict liability either
through the guise of the negligence of a third party or through an alter-
ation of the product or both.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 3 ' Ford sent notices warning its
dealers of a faulty starter mechanism on its tractors and instructed the
dealers to make repairs on the affected machinery. A dealership re-
ceived one of the tractors in question after it had been damaged by fire.
The dealership repaired the fire damage but ignored the starter prob-
lem, leaving the defect uncorrected. It then resold the tractor to the
plaintiff who was injured when the tractor started in gear. Ford was
held liable, and the court ruled that Ford's liability could not be re-
lieved by the foreseeable negligence of a retailer to remedy the problem
or by the purchaser's failure to guard against the defect's existence.' 32
126. Id. at § 44, at 281-86.
127. See Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1933) (sounding automobile horn which
caused steamboat collision in a fog); Morril v. Morril, 104 N.J.L. 557, 142 A. 337 (1928) (wind
blew door latch against boy's eye).
128. W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 44, at 286-89.
129. See Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1933) in which de-
fendant negligently failed to clean an oil barge, leaving a potentially explosive residue. The fact
that lightning ignited the barge, injuring nearby workmen, did not relieve the defendant of the
expectable results. W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 44, at 286 n.31.
130. W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 79, at 517-22. Two exceptions noted therein involving
animals, Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (1881) and Kinmouth v. McDougall, 19 N.Y.S.
771 (Sup. Ct. 1892), af'd, 139 N.Y. 612, 35 N.E. 204 (1893), appear to find the results to be within
the ambit of risk. See also Harper, supra note 56, at 1009.
131. 291 So. 2d 169 (Miss. 1974).
132. Id. at 177. A similar result was reached in Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App.
[Vol. 14:338
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A similar analysis was applied with a different result in FordMotor Co.
v. Eads.13 3 There a tractor was defective because its starter plunger
was too short to allow the tractor to be started, and the dealer had re-
peatedly failed to repair it. At the suggestion of the dealer, the plain-
tiffs brother "hot-wired" the engine, causing a by-pass of the safety
mechanism designed to prevent the tractor from being started in gear.
The brother's action was ruled an unforeseeable intervening cause
which rendered Ford not strictly liable for the resulting damage.
These decisions, following similar findings in the area of negli-
gence,134 have, with few exceptions, 35 subordinated strict liability to a
negligence-like determination of intervening cause based upon foresee-
ability. The better rule is to hold a defendant liable if his dangerous
product is a factor contributing to the plaintiff's injury, without regard
to whether an intervening circumstance was foreseeable to the defend-
ant. As a matter of policy, strict liability was conceived as a device for
spreading the cost of harm from hazardous products without regard to
individualized fault. As such, to delve into an inquiry of foreseeability
in cases of intervening negligence is counterproductive. It often results
in a plaintiffs having to recover, if at all, from the intervening party,
who is frequently less solvent than the manufacturer and less able to
absorb and distribute the cost of the injury.
The second major area in which the concept of intervening causa-
tion is seen involves alteration of a product such that it is not in sub-
stantially the same condition as it was when it left the hands of the
manufacturer. 136 Often a factual question is presented of whether the
defect or the alteration caused the injury. In General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 37 for example, there was evidence that there may have been
some alteration of a carburetor on the plaintiffs truck when he reinstal-
3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973). See also Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281
(1972) (the fact that a manufacturer may expect someone else to install safety devices will not
immunize him); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972) (same); Recent
Cases, Torts-Products Liability-Manufacturer May Be Held Strictly Liable to Employee of Pur-
chaser for Failure to Install Safety Devices Despite Expectation that They Would Be Installed by
Purchaser.-Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972), 86 HARV. L. REV. 923
(1973).
133. 224 Tenn. 473, 457 S.W.2d 28 (1970). The court inigmatically added that the issue of
foreseeability was relatively insignificant. Id. at -, 457 S.W.2d at 32.
134. See, e.g., Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 59 P.2d 100 (1936).
135. "'[A]n unreasonably dangerous defect' under Section 402A which is a proximate cause
of a plaintiff's injuries may result in the imposition of strict liability, even where an intervening
cause might not have been 'foreseeable' by the defendant." Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse
Auto. Air Brake Co., 517 P.2d 406, 413 (Colo. App. 1973).
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402A, comment p, at 357.
137. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
1978]
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led it after it had malfunctioned. But the evidence showed that a de-
sign defect made it possible for the carburetor to become locked,
causing the engine to race out of control. The court found that the
defect and not the alteration was the producing cause of the injury.
Thus, it held that a manufacturer or supplier of a dangerously defective
product, if it is to escape liability due to an alteration, must prove a
cause-in-fact connection between the alteration and the injury.
Clearly, where an alteration and not a defect causes injury, no lia-
bility should attach. However, where it is not the alteration which
causes the injury or where the alteration exacerbates a latent defect
without the injured party's knowledge (removing any question of as-
sumption of risk), the plaintiff should be allowed to recover.
The negligence standards of intervening causation (based upon the
foreseeability test),138 as often applied to strict liability, focus attention
upon conduct rather than condition and lead to lengthy considerations
of individualized fault inappropriate in a strict liability action. The
problems raised by questions of intervening causation can be ade-
quately dealt with through the sequential view of proximate cause. A
manufacturer or supplier should not be liable for all acts of third par-
ties nor for every manner in which its products can be (ab)used. Those
intervening causes which are sufficiently substantial would serve to
break the sequential chain of causation, and fairness would dictate that
the manufacturer not be liable. Dwelling upon hair-splitting distinc-
tions based on foreseeability, and the notions of negligence which un-
derlie it, leads to results hardly distinguishable from those in actions
based purely on negligence and on who is more at fault. To summa-
rize, to the extent that proximate cause is an element of strict products
liability law, it should be approached as a determination of both the
sequential chain of events and whether those events resulted in the in-
jury.
VIII. DEFENSES TO STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY WITHOUT THE
LIMITATION OF FORESEEABILITY
The two most common defenses in actions for negligence are con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk. The majority of courts
have held that these are affirmative defenses which must be pleaded
and proved by the defendant. 39 Courts and commentators have dis-
138. Misuse is sometimes regarded as an intervening cause, but misuse is dealt with in a sepa-
rate section of this article. See notes 203-222 infra and accompanying text.
139. W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 65, at 416. For an analysis of the use of contributory
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cussed at length the conceptual aspects of these defenses and the se-
mantic distinctions between them, and there has been much confusion
in their applications. 4 0 Traditionally, the two defenses have had con-
siderable overlap,' 4 1 and some courts either have used the terms inter-
changeably or have refused to delineate their distinctions. 142 The usual
approach in distinguishing the two has been to say that assumption of
risk entails both a subjective knowledge and appreciation of the risk
involved as well as a voluntary acquiescence thereto, whether reason-
able or unreasonable, 143 much like the common law principle of volenti
nonfit injuria.'" Contributory negligence, on the other hand, refers to
conduct of the plaintiff which may be inadvertent but which falls below
the standard of care which would have been exercised by a reasonable
person. 145 The two defenses may commingle in those instances in
which the plaintiff unreasonably elected the risk 146 or in which he, hav-
ing undertaken an ordinarily reasonable risk, thereafter neglected to
exercise due care for his safety. 1
47
A. Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence had its origins in Butterfield v.
Forrester.t48  In that case the plaintiff, while galloping his horse
through the streets of Derby, collided with a pole which the defendant
negligence in negligence and breach of warranty actions, see Bushnell, Illusory Defense of Contrib-
utory Negigence in Product Liability, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 412 (1963); Weston, Contributory
Negligence in Products Liability, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 424 (1963). OKLA. CONsT. art 13, § 6,
provides that assumption of risk and contributory negligence shall at all times be questions of fact
for the jury.
140. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), and the authori-
ties cited therein; Epstein, Products Liability Defenses Based on Plainti's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L.
REv. 267; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 50 (1966);
Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240.
141. W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 68, at 440-41. It is also pointed out that, in the area of
overlap, a defendant could choose either (or both) and clear distinctions were not necessary since
either prevented recovery.
142. Decker v. Fox River Tractor Co., 324 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Stukes v. Trowell,
119 Ga. App. 651, 168 S.E.2d 616 (1969). But see Independent Nail & Packing Co. v. Mitchell,
343 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1965). Indeed, one court described contributory negligence as a voluntary,
unreasonable assumption by the plaintiff of a known hazard. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co.,
76 N.J. 152, -, 386 A.2d 816, 821 (1978).
143. W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 68, at 440-41.
144. "He who consents cannot receive an injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1746 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968). See W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 68, at 440.
145. W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 68, at 441.
146. See, e.g., Adair v. Valley Flying Serv., 196 Or. 479, 250 P.2d 104 (1952) (flying with an
intoxicated pilot).
147. See, e.g., Oast v. Mopper, 58 Ga. App. 506, 199 S.E. 249 (1938) (riding in car with sleepy
driver and making no effort to exit the car or keep the driver awake).
148. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
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had put across part of the road. The court found that the plaintiff had
been negligent and that "[i]f he had used ordinary care he must have
seen the obstruction; so that the accident appeared to happen entirely
from his own fault."' 49 As both a matter of policy and of proximate
cause, the court held that there must be two elements present in such an
action: negligence on the part of the defendant and absence of negli-
gence on the plaintiff's part.'5 0 As it has been applied in some strict
liability cases, the doctrine of contributory negligence acted as a bar to
recovery for a plaintiff who had thoughtlessly or unintentionally used a
defective product. 5' These cases adopted the policy argument that one
is never relieved of the duty to exercise reasonable care for his own
safety; he cannot thrust all responsibility for it upon others.'l 2 If a
court adopts strict liability but holds to the idea that there must have
been some negligence on the part of the manufacturer of a product
later proved defective and dangerous, even though the negligence can-
not be demonstrated, then it is likely that the court will allow contribu-
tory negligence as a defense. 3 This is much like the approach in
Dippel v. Sciano.54 The court in that case found that strict liability is
based upon negligence and that selling a defective product is neg-
ligenceper se against which the negligence of the plaintiff may readily
be set.
The Dippel court, however, rather than viewing contributory negli-
gence as a complete bar to recovery, applied a form of comparative
negligence wherein the plaintiff's negligence was measured against the
negligence per se of the defendant, and damages were apportioned ac-
cordingly.' 55 Decisions such as that in Diopel have apparently been
149. Id. at 927.
150. Id. See also International & G.N.R. Co. v. Schubert, 130 S.W. 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910)
and St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Rice, 51 Ark. 467, 11 S.W. 699 (1889) where contributory negli-
gence was approached as an element of proximate cause.
151. In those states which recognize contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability, the
plaintiff's recovery will be barred by his failure to discover or foresee hazards which the ordinarily
prudent person would have discovered or foreseen, or by his engaging in negligent conduct after
such discovery. See, e.g., Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970);
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Contributory negligence often involves
"misuse", moreover, as in Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965). Misuse
is discussed herein as a subsection of assumption of risk. See notes 203-22 infra and accompany-
ing text.
152. Chadwick v. Ek, 1 Wash. 2d 117, 129, 95 P.2d 398, 403 (1939). It has also been held that
"lack of ordinary due care could constitute a defense to strict tort liability." West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976) (road grader ran over plaintiffs decedent).
153. See Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, andAssumption of
Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 129 (1972).
154. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
155. Mr. Justice Hallows in a concurring opinion in D4pel writes:
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motivated by two considerations in adopting comparative negligence in
strict liability. The first is an abhorrence of complete bars to recovery
by a negligent plaintiff who has fallen victim to a dangerous product.15 6
The second is a desire to reduce damages in the amount of the plain-
tiffs negligence, or, put another way, to limit the plaintiffs recovery to
that portion of his injury attributable to the defective product. 57  The
What we mean is that a seller who meets the conditions of sec. 402A, Restatement,
Torts 2d, in Wisconsin is guilty of negligence as a matter of law and such negligence is
subject to the ordinary rules of causation and the defense applicable to negligence.
While the Restatement, Torts 2d, sec. 402A imposes a strict or absolute liability regard-
less of the negligence of the seller, we do not.
37 Wis. 2d at -, 155 N.W.2d at 66 (concurring opinion).
As was pointed out, the Wisconsin court in Dippel was convinced that strict liability is
founded upon negligence and therefore readily accepted traditional negligence defenses. There is
little deviation, then, between results in a negligence action, particularly of the res 6osa loquitur
variety, and an action founded upon strict liability in which the classic negligence defenses are
utilized and wherein harsh results can sometimes be expected. This was recognized in Hagenbuch
v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972), as it too adopted a form of comparative
negligence in strict liability. In that case a defective hammer chipped and seriously injured the
plaintiffs eye. The plaintiff, a mechanic, had observed a chip in the hammer, a piece of which had
apparently lodged in his finger. He had returned it to the supplier who refused to exchange it or
otherwise make good the purchase on the basis that there was no warranty against chipping. The
plaintiff continued to use it until it again chipped, striking him in the eye. Because of his contin-
ued use of the defective product, the plaintiff was deemed to have been negligent. "Had the
accident occured just five weeks earlier, plaintiffs conduct would have been an absolute bar to
recovery," the court said, taking note of the legislative replacement of contributory negligence
with comparative negligence. Id. at 681. The plaintiffs damages were reduced by 20%.
The court in Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973),
lamented the absence of a comparative negligence scheme in New York with regard to strict liabil-
ity. Id. at 345, 298 N.E.2d at 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 472. The legislature, heeding the invitation,
adopted a pure comparative negligence statute. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 1411, 1412, 1413 (Mc-
Kinney 1976).
156. Discussing England's adoption of comparative negligence, the court in Frummer v.
Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 840, -,304 N.Y.S.2d 335, 342 (1969), said:
England's rejection of the all or nothing approach of the common law rule reflects a
view that a person who is principally responsible for injuries to another should not es-
cape liability completely because the injured party was also in part at fault. The argu-
ment that the common-law rule deters carelessness on the part of the plaintiff is rejected
as being highly unrealistic. If fear for one's own life or health will not induce a decent
regard for one's own safety, then the prospect of not recovering damages surely will not.
If, indeed, the regulation of conduct is one of the functions of the contributory negli-
gence rule-and this is extremely doubtful-then the common-law rule ran the wrong
way. There is more psychological reality to the proposition that the threat of liability
may influence persons to consider possible risks to others before embarking on a danger-
ous course of conduct. In any event, the common-law rule gave too much weight to
deterring carelessness on the part of a plaintiff while removing all incentive to care on
the part of a defendant. England's rule achieves a better balance. There is no doubt that
the principal motive for change in the law in England is the harsh lack of proportion and
the immorality in a rule which denies an injured person all compensation although his
responsibility for the accident and the resulting injuries may be minor.
157. Hopkins v. General Motors Corp., 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). See generally Twerski,
From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60
MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintifr's Fault- The Uniform Compara-
tive Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REv. 373 (1978); Comment, Comparative Fault and Strict Products
Liability: Are They Compatible?, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 501 (1978).
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Supreme Court of Alaska, in adopting comparative negligence in strict
products liability actions, thought it anomalous to allow mitigated
damages if a plaintiff sues in negligence but to allow full recovery if he
sues in strict liability. 58 The court noted that the legal purist might
find it theoretically difficult to balance apples and oranges-the plain-
tiff's negligence against no requirement of negligence on the part of the
defendant manufacturer-but ultimately overlooked the incon-
gruity.' 59 The court did, however, proclaim that foreseeability had no
place in strict products liability.1 60
To apply comparative negligence to strict liability, however, is
again to subordinate strict liability's public policy aspects to the fault
balancing of negligence.' 61 This approach has been judicially re-
nounced. 62 If risk is truly to be allocated to an industry without regard
to fault when that enterprise unleashes a hazardous product upon the
public, that end is not served by having producers benefit from the mo-
mentary lapses or inadvertent negligence of a plaintiff injured by such
a product. The defense of contributory negligence should be limited to
those instances in which the plaintiff had full knowledge of the prod-
uct's defect or of its dangerous condition but proceeded unreasonably
to fly in the face of the hazard, thereby incurring an assumption of risk
sufficient to relieve the supplier or manufacturer of liability. 63 A user
or consumer of a defective or hazardous product without knowledge of
its condition, as well as one who experiences a momentary or inadver-
tent lapse in his instincts, is in that class of persons who are powerless
to protect themselves and for whom Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
158. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976). See
also Mr. Justice Rabinowitz's concurring opinion therein favoring the adoption of comparative
causation rather than comparative negligence. Id. at 47 (concurring opinion).
159. Id. at 45. See generally, Adler, Strict Products Liability: The Implied Warrant, of Safely,
and Neglifgence With Hindsight, As Tests of Defects, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 581, 601 (1974);
Schwartz, Strict Liablilty and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974), supporting
the application of comparative negligence to strict liability.
160. "[Wle are not convinced that the doctrine of foreseeability provides a viable conceptual
basis upon which to predicate a defense in products liability cases. It appears to focus on negli-
gence rather than upon proximate cause, which is the primary issue in products liability." Butaud
v. Surburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976).
161. See Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 SYRAcusE L. REv. 924, 943
(1969).
162. 'qo initially apply a theory of comparative negligence to an area of the law in which
liability is not premised on negligence seems particularly inappropriate." McCown v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co. 463 Pa. 13,-, 342 A.2d 381, 382 n.3 (1975). Similarly, "comparative negli-
gence has no application to products liability actions under § 402A." Kinard v. Coats Co., 553
P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. App. 1976).
163. See the dissenting opinion in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555
P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976) (dissenting opinion).
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Inc. 164 stands as a monument.
The more rational approach to this entire aspect of contributory
negligence is embodied in the Restatement (Second) wherein contribu-
tory negligence, except that which constitutes assumption of risk, is not
a defense to strict liablity. t65 As the foregoing indicates, this approach
has not found universal acceptance, 66 but it is the rule which logic, the
majority of jurisdictions,167 and the evolution of strict liability support.
It may be helpful, in considering the Restatement's position, to
look to the early cases dealing with animals which wereferae naturae.
The courts recognized that only voluntary assumption of risk was a
sufficient defense to the strict liability imposed in such cases. In short,
one must be found to have visited the injury upon himself.'6 8 This
approach has been utilized, appropriately enough, by courts in strict
products liability. Harking back to the animal cases and finding in
those decisions that no distinction was drawn between a failure to dis-
cover the nature of a vicious animal and a careless encounter with its
viciousness thereafter, courts have applied the same rule to products
liability. Contributory negligence, even following the discovery of a
164. "The purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defec-
tive products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, -, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1967).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402A, comment n, at 356. Compare Postilion,
Strict Liability and Contributory Negligence. The Two Just Don't Mix, 57 ILL. B.J. 26, 29 (1968)
("Negligence of the plaintiff is not relevant to strict tort liability.") with Groark, Contributory Neg-
ligence-An Integral Part of Products Liability Cases, 56 ILL. B.J. 904 (1968), which Postilion,
citing the same cases, seeks to rebut.
166. That contributory negligence is not a bar has been criticized and called "a rule without a
rationale." Schwartz, supra note 159, at 176, citing Noel, supra note 153, at 107-14. See also Ettin
v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969).
167. See, e.g. O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Barth v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545
P.2d 1104, (1976); Sandy v. Bushey, 124 Me. 320, 128 A. 513 (1925); Fields v. Volkswagon of
America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, 509 P.2d
28 (1973); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales
Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
168. Muller v. McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195, 29 Am. Rep. 123 (1878), wherein the court held:
If a person with full knowledge of the evil propensities of an animal wantonly excites
him, or voluntarily and unnecessarily puts himsulf in the way of such an animal, he
would be adjudged to have brought the injury upon himself, and ought not to be entitled
to recover. In such a case it cannot be said, in a legal sense, that the keeping of the
animal, which is the gravamen of the offense, produced the injury. (citations omit-
ted). . . . To enable the owner of such an animal to interpose this defense [of contribu-
tory negligence], acts should be proved with notice of the character of the animal, which
would establish that the person injured voluntarily brought the calamity upon himself."
Id. at -, 29 Am. Rep. at 126-27.
The defendant being held strictly liable cannot be absolved "by any act of the person injured,
unless it be one from which it can be affirmed that he caused the injury himself, with a full
knowledge of its probable consequences." Id. at -, 29 Am. Rep. at 129.
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defect, has been held to be no defense under this rationale; the rule is
the same whether the risk encountered is a dangerous animal or a de-
fective product. 69 The vicious animal cases noted that, because negli-
gence was not the grounds of liability, contributory negligence was not
a defense. 7 ° The same should be true in products liability.
Contributory negligence has been characterized as a discredited
doctrine which destroys the claims of persons who have in some man-
ner, however slight, contributed to their own injuries.' 7 ' By placing a
product on the market, a manufacturer or supplier is deemed to have
made an affirmation of its safety and fitness for use without defect. If
this affirmation were held to be made only to careful persons, the re-
strictions upon the liability the supplier or manufacturer would be
enormous and beyond what the law should allow.' 72 The courts need
no longer act as protectors of burgeoning industries which, if not nur-
tured in their infancy, could succumb to the technological hazards of
their own creation. Producers today are generally in a position either
to act as self-insurers and cost-spreaders, or they are able to obtain lia-
bility insurance, the cost of which is ultimately passed on to the con-
sumer in tiny fractional increments of the pricing structure. As
industry was once protected from the imposition of ruinous judgments,
so now must the consumer be protected from otherwise ruinous dam-
ages. 173
B. Assumption of Risk
Assumption of risk, though sometimes viewed as a part of contrib-
utory negligence, is a very different matter and should, unlike contribu-
tory negligence, properly serve as a limitation upon strict liability even
where a defective product is involved.' 74 While contributory negli-
169. See, e.g., Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1975).
170. Muller v. McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195, -, 29 Am. Rep. 123, 128 (1878).
171. Pope & Talbott, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953).
172. Lascher, supra note 18, at 50-51. Contra, Plant, supra note 18, at 950, who gets a "pecu-
liar sensation in the pit of his stomach at the thought of. . .liability being imposed" by a negli-
gent plaintiff upon a potentially nonnegligent defendant.
173. Cf Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 840, -, 304 N.Y.S.2d 335, 341-42
(1969). It has also been pointed out that
[a] large portion of mass-produced items is manufactured with as poor quality as the
market will support. . . .The de facto victimization of the consumer requires that con-
tributory negligence should not constitute a defense in an action for personal injuries
incurred through use of a defective product regardless of the theory under which the
plaintiff proceeds.
Epstein, spra note 140, at 284.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402 A, comment n: "[Tlhe form of contributory
negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known dan-
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gence is based on an objective standard of conduct, assumption of risk
is highly subjective. It involves a conscious encounter with a known
danger by consent or design, coupled with the willingness to take a
chance.17- Assumption of risk further involves what the particular
plaintiff saw, knew, understood, and appreciated, 176 as well as his age,
lack of information, experience, intelligence, and judgment. 177 In addi-
tion to the foregoing, the Restatement (Second) adds a requirement
under strict products liability: the assumption of risk must be unreason-
able.178 To some extent this may be thought to be a reintroduction of
the reasonable person standard. Great care must be taken to insure
that the reasonableness of the standard is not based upon what an ordi-
nary person of reasonable prudence would have done in the same or
similar circumstances, but rather is based upon what was reasonable
for a given plaintiff under the influence of all present subjective fac-
tors. 179 Assumption of risk should be an extremely difficult standard to
meet, for it implies that the plaintiff engaged in conduct with the
knowledge that, with substantial certainty, he would be injured. It is
that knowledge which makes his conduct unreasonable. 180 Assumption
ger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as
in other cases of strict liability." Id. at 356.
175. Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 IUl. App. 2d 6, -, 236 N.E.2d 439, 448, af 'd, 46 Il. 2d 64, 264
N.E.2d 170 (1970). This was also well stated in Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 171 N.W.2d 201
(Minn. 1969):
Assumption of risk in the classic sense does not involve failure to use reasonable care.
Instead, it is based on a subjective analysis and may be found whenever the plaintiff (1)
had knowledge of the risk, (2) appreciated the risk, and (3) had a choice to avoid the risk
and voluntarily chose to chance it.
Id. at 211 n.6. See also Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 45 IUl. App. 3d 981, 360 N.E.2d
440 (1977); Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 576 P.2d 711 (Mont. 1978); Maxey v. Freightliner
Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 496D, comment c, at 575.
177. Id See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 496A, comment d, at 562 and
§ 496C, comment e, at 571.
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2 § 402A, comment n, at 356. See also Luque v.
McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972):
Ordinary contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a strict liability action.
"The only form of plaintiff's negligence that is a defense to strict liability is that which
consists of voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, more
commonly referred to as assumption of risk. For such a defense to arise, the user or
consumer must become aware of the defect and still proceed unreasonably to make use
of the product."
Id. at 145, 501 P.2d at 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50 (emphasis by the court).
179. See, e.g., Saeter v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 248, 8 Cal. Rptr. 747
(1960), in which age and experience is used to show that plaintiff knew or should have known of
the risk. A different result was reached in Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 11. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439
(1968), ajy'd, 46 Ill. 2d 64, 264 N.E.2d 170 (1970), involving a broken nail and a young, briefly
experienced carpenter. See note 175 supra.
180. It is risky, but not unreasonably so, to cross a street-even with the forethought that an
approaching automobile might have a defective steering mechanism. It is quite another matter to
1978]
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of risk has not been accepted by all commentators as a viable defense
to strict liability,' but when viewed critically it would appear that a
producer's liability should not extend to situations in which the plaintiff
patently brought the damage upon himself.
There should be limits, however, to this defense. If it is accepted
that, as premised above,182 a corollary of the risk allocation policy
justification for strict liability is to provide an incentive for safer prod-
ucts, the defense of assumption of risk may be seen as negating that
incentive. Consider the cigarette industry, for example. If assumption
of risk stands as a defense to liability for damages caused by its prod-
ucts, that industry would have little or no incentive to produce safer
products.' In addition, when a cigarette manufacturer, or any other
manufacturer for that matter, markets an inherently dangerous product
and thereafter expends tremendous sums of money and effort advertis-
ing and encouraging consumers to disregard the risk, the manufacturer
should be held liable when its perilous invitation is accepted. To profit
from knowingly enticing another to injure himself and thereafter to es-
cape the cost of that injury is untenable. 84
purposefully stand in front of an oncoming car known to be uncontrollable on the odd chance that
it might somehow miss.
181. Policy justifications for recognizing defenses of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk are plainly less cogent . . . in relation to claims based on strict liability.
Though the issue is debatable, it appears that the better solution is to deny recognition of
an independent defense of consent to risk in cases of strict liability for injuries resulting
from defective products.
Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liabiliy Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122, 166 (1961). Also
advocating the proposition that assumption of risk has no place in strict liability is Lascher, .wpra
note 18, at 54.
Further, it was observed in Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools, 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972)
that "despite the Restatement's position that strict liability is not based upon negligence, the al-
lowance of contributory negligence, or as the Restatement prefers, the doctrine of assumption of
the risk, as a defense injects at least a flavor of negligence into the strict liability doctrine." Id. at
682. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 68, at 454-57; James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy
Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968).
182. See notes 84-88 supra and accompanying text.
183. See Wegman, Cigarettes andHealth: A LegalAnaiysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678, 718 (1966).
184. While it may strike one as a harsh thing to say about industrial leaders who have
enjoyed a mantle of respectability that their conduct in making and aggressively market-
ing cigarettes constitutes the intentional infliction of death, there seems to be no other
permissible characterization of it. One intends the consequences which are known to
follow with substantial certainty from his actions. Stated conservatively, there is now
substantial certainty that the making and aggressive marketing of cigarettes will cause
thousands of premature deaths annually. In known certainty of results, there is no differ-
ence between the actions of cigarette manufacturers who make, sell, and promote the use
of their deadly product, and the angry man who fires his gun into a crowd. Neither
knows who is to die, but both know with substantial certainty that someone will.
White, Strict Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers andAssumption of Risk, 29 LA. L. REV. 589, 616-
17 (1969). Query: "Can a manufacturer after it has recommended that the [product] be used in a
way fraught with peril, and after injury results from that use, obtain judgment as a matter of law
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Assumption of risk involves a three-part test: (1) knowledge of the
risk, (2) voluntary assumption thereof, and (3) the unreasonableness of
the risk assumption. Obviously, as to the first element, one cannot as-
sume a risk of which he is unaware. 18 5 Even in negligence actions, it is
recognized that the plaintiff must have an actual, subjective apprecia-
tion of the danger and the attendant risks involved therein. In strict
liability, moreover, it is not enough to say that the plaintiff should have
realized the danger.'86 The question is what the plaintiff himself per-
ceived and not what a reasonable person would have appreciated in
those same circumstances. 8 7 This subjective requirement is extremely
important and must not be lightly established, for it is doubtful that
many consumers would knowingly play Russian roulette with a dan-
gerous product where they fully appreciate the potential consequences.
Secondly, as with negligence, the assumption of risk must be in all
respects a voluntary choice on'the part of the plaintiff, made after he
has determined the hazards involved.' 88 Cases involving work-related
by asserting that the danger should have been fully apparent to anyone who so used it?" Jamieson
v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 38 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
To allow a manufacturer to induce a consumer to ignore the hazards of his product and
thereby "assume the risk" which the manufacturer knows to be present is against public policy.
Rather, the manufacturer should assume the risk that the consumer will be so persuaded, and it
should bear the costs which its inducements create.
There exists . . . no real alternative and no valid objection to this distribution of the
burden, if the public health is to be protected in any practical sense from exploitation by
those who, for a profit motive, undertake to supply the vast and ever increasing variety of
products which the people by unprecedented powers of commercial persuasion are daily
urged to use and consume.
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 173 (Fla. 1963).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402A, comment n, at 356. See Shamrock Fuel
& Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
186. See, e.g., Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963), aft'd, 376
S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1964). But see Bereman v. Burdolski, 204 Kan. 162, -, 460 P.2d
567, 569 (1969), where the defendant was absolved of liability because the plaintiff should have
known of defective brakes. It may be, however, that the language of the case indicates that he
should have known and, in view of the totality of the fact situation, actually did know.
It does not constitute assumption of risk, for instance, for a worker to be aware that he is
working around heavy machinery which poses some degree of danger and that if his body comes
in contact with moving parts he is likely to be injured. Thus, it was held not to constitute encoun-
tering a known risk where a plaintiff had lost his footing and had fallen between the drum and
stationary hopper of a concrete mixer alleged defective because of the absence of safeguards to
prevent such accidents. In the court's words, "evidence must show that plaintiff had actual knowl-
edge of the specific danger posed by the defect in manufacture or design, and not just a general
knowledge that the machinery could be dangerous." Culp v. Rexnord & Booth-Rouse Equip. Co.,
553 P.2d 844, 845 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
187. "[A] finding of assumption of risk must be based on the individuals own subjective
knowledge, not upon the objective knowledge of a 'reasonable man.'" Berkebile v. Brantly Heli-
copter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, -, 337 A.2d 893, 901-02 (Pa. 1975) (citing Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.
Supp. 753, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 402A, comment n, at 356. See also Elder v.
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accidents illustrate the problem surrounding this requirement. Some
courts have held in such cases that work pressures and fear of losing
one's job do not excuse an employee's assumption of risk. 8 9 Such deci-
sions do not seem to evaluate realistically the subjective, voluntary na-
ture of an employee's action. Nor do they take into account the
enormous pressure upon workers to preserve their jobs and their future
employment prospects, especially when faced with tight job markets
and high unemployment. These problems have caused other courts to
realize properly that the voluntary character of the worker's undertak-
ing of assigned hazardous duties, or of his use of dangerous machinery,
is illusory.' 9° The better rule is that job-related dangers can never be
said as a matter of law to be voluntarily assumed. 19 In every instance
the matter of voluntary and unconstrained assumption of a subjectively
known hazard must be a question of fact to be evaluated with great
care. Numerous influences may exert themselves whenever a decision
is made, and this is especially so where the decision involves a risk.
Constraints outside the plaintiff and beyond his control may serve to
influence unduly the willingness with which the danger is encountered.
The foregoing constitutes the basic common law doctrine of as-
sumption of risk. Where strict liability is involved, a third element of
an unreasonable assumption of risk has been added. 9 2 This has gener-
ally been adopted by the courts, 19 and it is naturally recognized that a
consumer's reasonable assumption of risk is no defense for the manu-
facturer. 94 The unanswered question is whether the standard to be
applied is that of a reasonably prudent person. It is probably true that
Crawley Book Mach. Co., 441 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1971)(applying Pennsylvania law); Barkewich v.
Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968); W. PROSSER, Supra note 1 10,§ 68, at 450.
189. See, e.g., Ralston v. Illinois Power Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 95, 299 N.E.2d 497 (1973).
190. Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Johnson v, Clark
Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132 (1976). Contra, Prince v. Galis Mfg. Co., 58 I11. App. 3d
1056, 374 N.E.2d 1318 (1978).
191. Brown v. Quick Mix Co.,_75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969).
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A, supra note 2, comment n, at 356. Unreasonable as-
sumption of risk was also recognized in the case of strict liability for dangerous animals. See, e.g.,
Sandy v. Bushey, 124 Me. 320, 128 A. 513 (1925).
193. See, e.g., Kirkland v. General Mot6rs Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Ferraro v. Ford
Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966); McNichols, The Kirkland v. General Motors Manu-
facturer's Products Liablity Doctrine-What's In 4 Name?, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 347 (1974).
194. "[A] plaintiffs choice to encounter the risk ought not to bar his recovery if the choice was
reasonable, even though he fully understood the risk." Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19
Sw. L.J. 61, 75 (1965). See also Messik v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972);
Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 981, 360 N.E.2d 440 (1977). To the
same effect in a negligence action is Dawson v. Payless For Drugs, 248 Or. 334, 433 P.2d 1019
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a plaintiff rarely takes a chance which, in his estimation, is truly unrea-
sonable. He obviously must have expectations of remaining uninjured
or his conduct would amount to an intentional infliction of injury upon
himself.195 The question of judging the reasonableness of the risk as-
sumption is difficult to resolve, and it carries with it the danger that a
negligence standard will be reimposed upon strict liability. Perhaps it
is enough that the matter be approached with caution and with the
realization that there are circumstances under which the plaintiffs con-
duct may fall below the standard of the reasonable person and yet be
reasonable for that particular plaintiff. There appear to be at least two
approaches to the question: one based upon a subjective analysis of the
plaintiff's conduct and the other involving a question of the duty of the
manufacturer similar to a negligence analysis.
The first approach is illustrated by Johnson v. Clark Equinent
Co.,'9 6 in which the plaintiff, app~arently under considerable pressure
and time contraints, was moving bundles bound with metal bands with
the use of a fork lift. In a hurry and without his assistant, the plaintiff,
rather than dismounting and moving in front of the fork lift to cut the
metal bindings before discharging his load, reached through the lift
mechanism to snip the bindings. While so doing, he accidentally acti-
vated the lift which severed his arms. Such conduct may be thought to
fall below the care which would have been exercised by a reasonably
prudent person. However, the conduct may also be seen as having
been reasonable, given the totality of the circumstances coupled with
the degree of danger or risk perceived by the plaintiff.
In Johnson, the court held that whether the plaintiff's decision to
encounter a known danger was reasonable pertained only to the plain-
tiff's decision itself and not to the apparent reasonableness of the physi-
cal conduct by which he carried out his decision.' 97 The court further
determined that the decision must be evaluated as of the time it was
made and that working conditions may be considered even though they
were not related to the conduct of the manufacturer of the allegedly
dangerous product.'98 Moreover, it should be noted that the condition
of the product was related to the question of the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's decision. Here, the lift's operating lever was open and ex-
195. A player of Russian roulette must have the belief that he will survive or it becomes a
matter of suicide. But a reasonably prudent person would no doubt conclude that to take the
chance of shooting oneself at all is unreasonable.
196. 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132 (1976).
197. Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, -, 547 P.2d 132, 140 (1976).
198. Id. at--, 547 P.2d 140-41.
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posed, and a fixed wire mesh would have prevented the plaintiff from
inserting his arms through the hoisting columns of the machine.
To summarize, a plaintiff injured by a dangerous product may be
expected to be careless or negligent in certain situations. This conduct
should not bar his recovery unless it was so extreme and outrageous
that it effectively broke the chain of causation. The plaintiff must be
seen as having brought the injury upon himself, rather than as having
suffered it as the result of the defective product.
A second approach, in the guise of duty, has also been sug-
gested.' 99 Barikewich v. Billinger2° involved a plaintiff who was oper-
ating a glass crushing machine. A piece of glass apparently became
lodged in the machine which seemed in danger of being damaged. The
plaintiff instinctively reached for the jammed piece, thinking he had
time to dislodge it before the next cycle of operation, and was injured.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a verdict for the plaintiff in
the strict liability action citing numerous negligence decisions. The
court ruled that a manufacturer is not "obligated to build a machine
that was designed not only to keep glass in, but people out.'' 20 ' Such an
analysis, based upon the duty of care owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, reverts to a simple negligence test. It does not reach the im-
portant question of the nature of assumption of risk in strict liability.
What is unreasonable, then, as an assumption of risk remains a
murky question. If it is based upon the objective reasonable person
standard, then the defense of assumption of risk is likely to be unduly
expanded. The better approach is to use reasonableness as a limitation
upon the defense of assumption of risk. That is to say, rather than
cutting off recovery for damages at the instant assumption of risk is
demonstrated, the determination should go further and allow compen-
sation for reasonable assumption of risk. Account should be taken of
the character of the danger, the magnitude of the risk, and the myriad
factors affecting the decision made by the plaintiff. Consideration
should be given to pressures acting upon the plaintiff, his age, experi-
ence, intelligence and state of mind, the condition of the product, and
the presence or absence of product safeguards. In short, the analysis
must be as inclusive and subjective as possible. A highly technological
society is, by its very nature, hazardous. If strict products liability is to
199. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Lia.
bilitvArea, 60 IowA L. REv. 1 (1974).
200. 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
201. Id. at -, 247 A.2d at 605.
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mitigate the harm which suddenly and catastrophically descends upon
an individual as a result of those hazards, strict liability must be suffi-
ciently free of fetters to accomplish this function.
It should be noted that assumption of risk, as a limitation on man-
ufacturers' and suppliers' liability, can also act as a more general bene-
fit to society. A user or consumer has the option of obtaining cheaper
but less safe products. Thus he accepts the higher risk potential in ex-
change for the benefit of lower prices and of the general availability of
goods which might otherwise be absent from the market place.202
C Misuse
One of the most important defenses in strict products liability has
traditionally been misuse or abnormal use of the product. Properly
viewed, misuse is a part of the assumption of risk analysis in which, at
the outset, a distinction is drawn between (1) use for an abnormal pur-
pose which would absolve the defendant of liability f the three-ele-
ment test for assumption of risk is met and (2) careless use2 1 for a
202. This concept of freedom of choice in assuming the risk or paying the price might be
somewhat illusory in that it presupposes the ability to choose. Obviously, there are millions of
consumers who, if they can afford a product at all, may only be able to purchase the least expen-
sive and potentially most dangerous item of its type. However, this may be offset by the product's
being available at all. As an example, rather than all automobiles conforming to the safety stand-
ards of a Mercedes-Benz, society (as represented by individual consumers) is willing to assume
certain risks in order that four-wheeled individual transportation be available to all, albeit with
less safety. It must also be remembered that the consumer must have sufficient information be-
yond the mere knowledge of a lower price to know of the risk he is assuming. In Seattle First
Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975), the court recognized that one cannot
expect as much safety in a Volkswagen as in a more expensive Cadillac. But it also noted that it
was "not the snub-nosed design [of the microbus] per se, but the lack of structural integrity in the
front panel" which was the alleged defect of which the decedents may have been unaware. Id. at
-, 542 P.2d at 779. As strict liability has been extended to include third parties as well as con-
sumers, see, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) and Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969), and since these
people make up a defenseless class who had no opportunity to make a risk/cost choice, assump-
tion of risk should not be applied to bystanders unless they meet the three elements of the subjec-
tive criteria, hereinabove reviewed, which would seem unlikely. See notes 185-98 infra and
accompanying text.
203. Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 56 (Okla. 1976).
Although it may be argued that the intended or foreseeable use doctrine is a compo-
nent entering into the determination of a defect, this classification rests uneasily within
the Restatement (Second), which views "defect" from the perspective of the plaintiff-
consumer, rather than from that of the defendant-manufacturer. Moreover, to make this
doctrine part of the plaintiffs prima facie case virtually guarantees the retention of the
foreseeability fault factor in the determination of a product's defect, even after the elimi-
nation of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement. The absorption of this concept of
intended use by the assumption of risk defense would keep the burden of going forward
with the evidence on the defendant, while guaranteeing that the defense of intended use
40
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normal purpose which would constitute contributory negligence. 204
There have been cases which restricted a manufacturer's liability
to those instances in which the product was being used in the manner
which was intended by the manufacturer. 2 5 This is clearly too narrow
a requirement since, while a manufacturer may intend a screwdriver to
drive screws, it is probable that it will be used for a variety of other
purposes, such as prying the lid off of a paint can. The Restatement
(Second) recognizes the defense of misuse but extends liability only to
foreseeable misuse of a product, 20 6 as does much of the negligence case
law.207 The foreseeable use doctrine can be found in numerous negli-
gence decisions such as cases which have held a defendant liable for
failing to foresee that one would stand on a chair as well as sit in it 20 or
for not anticipating that a highly flammable dress would be worn near
a stove.2 °9
Applying the foreseeability test to strict liability is incongruous in
view of the fact that the manufacturer's negligence is irrelevant. A
manufacturer is entitled to expect that normal use will be made of his
product.210  Nonetheless, the foreseeability test, when applied in the
misuse defense, reintroduces negligence so that only negligent manu-
facturers are liable for defective products or products without adequate
warnings.2t'
is limited to dangers subjectively known to the plaintiff rather than those merely foresee-
able. Cf. Restatement (Second), supra note 2, § 496 D.
Polelle, supra note 42, at 133 n.l 16.
204. Misuse has been referred to as "contributory negligence under another name." Kissel,
supra note 7, at 459.
205. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), a negligence
action, in which crashing in an automobile was held not to be the intended use to which the
product was to be put. See also Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973), a negli-
gent design action. In that case, an automobile hit the rear of a large truck and ran under it. The
court applied a duty analysis and concluded that a manufacturer did not have a duty to design a
vehicle with which it is safe to collide.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, comment h, at 351.
207. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I1. 2d 418, -, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), in which
the court defines misuse as "use for a purpose neither intended nor 'foreseeable' (objectively rea-
sonable) by the defendant." Id. at -, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
208. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951).
209. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 239 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952).
210. Maiorino v. Weco Prod. Co., 45 N.J. 570, -, 214 A.2d 18, 20 (1965) (warranty action).
Maiorino was limited to its facts in Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, -, 386 A.2d
816, 833 n.7 (1978). Prosser, supra note 18, at 1145. See also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODucTs LIABILITY § 16A [5][f] (1978); Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d 1057, 1100 (1967); Annot., 4 A.L.R.
3d 501 (1965).
211. See Noel, supra note 153, at 105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, comment j, at
353. Further, "[i]t is clear from the better-reasoned cases that directions for use, which merely tell
how to use the product, and which do not say anything about the danger of foreseeable misuse, do
not necessarily satisfy the duty to warn." I L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY
§ 8.05[l], at 162-63 (1978). Where a baby ingested detergent, the "use" was held unintended but
foreseeable:
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Strict products liability case law appears to have wholeheartedly
adopted the limitation of a manufacturer's liability to those uses of its
product which would have been foreseeable to a reasonably prudent
manufacturer. 12 But clearly such reasoning focuses attention, not on
the condition of the product, but on the conduct of the manufacturer or
supplier. Such an approach is inconsistent with strict products liability,
and it should be abandoned in favor of a subjective assumption of risk
analysis of the plaintiffs appreciation of his alleged misuse of the prod-
uct and of the attendant risks.
This can perhaps be illustrated by a case frequently cited for the
doctrine of misuse in strict products liability, McDivitt v. Standard Oil
Co.213 There the plaintiff purchased "high-trend, deep traction type"
tires2 4 for his station wagon (which was sometimes driven off the road
while camping) in size 850X 14 rather than the recommended 800x 14.
He believed that his car's rims were large enough to permit the tires'
use.215 It was further shown that while the tires were on the vehicle the
air pressure varied from fifteen to thirty-five pounds per square inch
A manufacturer may be liable. . . for damage caused by nonintended use of a product
if the use is one which may be reasonably foreseen. . . . If a product is not reasonably
safe for a use that may be expected to be made of it and no adequate warning is given of
its dangerous propensities, the manufacturer or seller of such a product may be liable
even though the product itself is faultlessly made.
Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 16 Ill. App. 3d 339, -, 306 N.E.2d 312, 316 (1974)
(citations omitted).
That negligence is still forcefully retained in strict liability actions may be illustrated by the
following. In attempting to formulate a workable jury instruction on foreseeable use in strict
liability, one commentator admittedly combines comments j and k of the Restatement (Second)
§ 395 which deal solely with negligence. Predictably, the result is a negligence instruction unrea-
sonably dangerous to the plaintiff when used in strict liability:
One who sells a product is not liable when harm results only because the product is
handled in some way that he has no reason to expect, or is used in an unforeseeable
manner. [The seller may, however, reasonably anticipate other uses than the one for
which the product is primarily intended.]
Hilton, The Strict Products Liability Case-Complaint, Defenses, and Instructions, 48 OR. L. REV.
192, 208 (1969). The bracketed portion is optional for use where foreseeability of the use in
question is an issue of fact. That instruction, however, is appropriate only for a negligence action
for its lays liability solely on a negligent seller.
For an examination of the foreseeability doctrine, misuse, and the duty to warn in actions for
negligence, see Dale and Hilton, Use fthe Product-When Is It Abnormal?, 4 WILLAMETrE L.J.
350 (1967). See also Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961).
212. See, e.g., Krammer v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 16 Ill. App. 3d 763, -, 306 N.E.2d
686, 689 (1974); Higgins v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Mo. 1970); Rogers v. Toro
Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Manufacturers may also be held liable for
foreseeable misuse of a product. See, e.g., Wilson v. Crouse-Hinds Co., 556 F.2d 870, 874 (8th
Cir. 1977) (electrical plug); Porter v. United Steel & Wire Co., 436 F. Supp. 1376, 1381-82 (N.D.
Iowa 1977) (shopping cart).
213. 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Texas law).
214. Id. at 366.
215. Id. at 365.
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(p.s.i.) although twenty-four to twenty-six p.s.i. was recommended.
McDivitt's wife, accompanied by her six minor children, was driving
the station wagon at approximately sixty miles per hour when the left
rear tire blew out. She retained control of the vehicle, but, by the time
she had slowed to thirty-five miles per hour, the left front tire came off
causing the car to overturn, injuring its occupants.21 6 Expert witnesses
disagreed on whether defects in the tires or misuse had caused the acci-
dent. The tires had been in use for nine months and had traveled sev-
eral thousand miles. 21  Given the facts of the case, it is difficult to
believe that the plaintiff subjectively appreciated that the tire/rim com-
bination was highly dangerous and potentially lethal nor that he
thereby assumed the risk for himself and for his family. It does appear
that the plaintiff was negligent in not using the tire size recommended
for his rim, but this hardly rises to the level of knowing misuse and
assumption of risk.1 8
Misuse as an affirmative defense would appear appropriate only in
those cases in which the plaintiff, given all of the subjective factors of
age, experience, intelligence, and the like, is found to have appreciated
the risk of harm which his actions had created and thus to have volun-
tarily and unreasonably assumed the risk. The court in McDivitt noted
that the purpose of strict liability is to provide judicial protection for
the otherwise defenseless consumer.2 1 9 A consumer who neither knew
nor fully appreciated the risk of harm which his use-albeit negli-
gent--of the defendant's product created is certainly defenseless. He
knew neither of the potential for harm nor of the need to be wary. The
need for tires and rims to vary in size is clear. But where a tire can be
mounted on the wrong size of rim with facility, concealing a hazardous
condition for many months and for thousands of miles, an unusually
dangerous condition exists from which liability should follow.
The approach of the McDivitt court appears to have been modified
for the better by the Texas Supreme Court in General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins.220 In that case, the court held that the harm must be reason-
216. Id. at 366.
217. The record admitted a discrepancy in the actual number of miles, with 3,800 and 7,200
being the extremes. Id.
218. An expert witness testified that "such a rim was capable of accomodating an 850X 14 tire"
indicating that such a choice by the plaintiff was not a flagrant or outrageous disregard of the
recommended size. Id.
219. Id. at 370.
220. 548 S.W.2d 344 (1977). See also Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.
1978); Note, General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins: Products Liability: Abrogation of the Misuse De-
fense in Texas, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 603 (1977).
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ably foreseeable to the user before his misuse will limit his recovery.z2
The effect of this is that the foreseeability concept has been transposed
to the plaintiff, and the question becomes what he, as a reasonable con-
sumer, should have foreseen. But, once again, the standard of the rea-
sonable person exercising due care has been introduced into strict
liability unnecessarily. The uses of so simple an item as a hammer are
as broad as imagination permits,222 and the question of foreseeability
about its use which arises when such a product is dangerously defective
is mere surplusage. If misuse is confined to the doctrine of assumption
of risk where it logically belongs, then the plaintiffs subjective recogni-
tion of the danger of the defect will relieve the defendant of liability
therefor. Otherwise no interest is served by relieving a manufacturer or
supplier of liability for having unleashed a defective product upon un-
suspecting users who are thereby injured. Misuse is a viable defense
only where it constitutes voluntary, knowing assumption of a subjec-
tively unreasonable risk. Otherwise, it is a return to negligence.
IX. CONCLUSION
Conceived as an alternative to negligence and breach of warranty,
strict products liability has nevertheless become infused with many of
the fault concepts of negligence which run counter to the principles and
policies of this rapidly developing tort. Foremost among these rem-
nants of negligence is the doctrine of foreseeability which remains per-
vasive throughout the current strict liability analysis. Foreseeability
serves an unfortunate role in that it refocuses attention on negligence
and on the attendant questions of reasonableness; contributory negli-
gence and its modern counterpart, comparative negligence; duty and
breach of duty; alteration and misuse; and proximate cause. Clearly
221. It is essential that the supplier prove, as an element of this defense, that the consumer
plaintiff should have reasonably anticipated as consequences of the misuse that the mal-
function or injury, or some similar malfunction or injury, would occur. The harm must
be reasonably foreseeable to the user if he is to be penalized. . . . If the malfunction
and damaging event are not reasonably foreseeable to the user, his misuse should not
limit his recovery.
548 S.W.2d at 351-52.
222. It may be noted that a hammer is an implement of beguiling simplicity, and there is
probably no artifact with so many uses, real or fancied. No one is in awe of the art of
using a hammer, and everyone deems himself competent to employ it, albeit, artfully or
in frustration. It is to be found in many households, and children, from the time they are
able to lift the artifact, can use it with enthusiasm, although the benefits may be dubious.
A hammer is a hammer to most people and limitations in the implement, or its age,
fitness and condition, are not apparent to the unsophisticated.
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, -, 229 N.E.2d 684, 691 (1967),
aff'd, 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
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any application of foreseeability results only in a determination of the
presence or absence of negligence.
The result is that liability without fault and the risk allocation the-
ories of strict liability are subrogated by negligence tests and by an in-
dividualized case-by-case fault finding analysis which is detrimental to
plaintiffs injured by dangerous products. Too often a strict products
liability case resembles little more than a res ipsa loquitur negligence
action with its traditional limitations grounded in negligence.
If compensation for both foreseeable and unforeseeable damages,
for hazards both known and unknown, and if the distribution of risk
throughout society as a cost of doing business is to proceed apace,
moral culpability based upon foreseeability must not be regarded as
elemental. The liability of a manufacturer or supplier is not rested
upon what he knew or should have known when he manufactured and
sold the product. Rather it is grounded upon his placing into the
stream of commerce a product which is demonstrated at trial to have
been dangerous.223
Eliminating the foreseeability factor would necessarily obviate the
usual defenses common to negligence actions and would leave a manu-
facturer or supplier with three defenses or limitations to liability: (1) a
pure form of assumption of risk on the part of the plaintiff, (2) the
statute of limitations,224 and (3) the production of safe products. Al-
though removal of the foreseeability doctrine from strict products lia-
bility analysis would have far-reaching consequences, the propriety of
such a revision is demonstrable. The erosion and eventual disappear-
ance of foreseeability as a legal landmark on the new frontiers of strict
products liability is to be anticipated and encouraged.
Tyrus V Dahl, Jr.
223. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 35 1. It would perhaps serve the best
interest of fairness, however, to have the issue of danger resolved as of the time of the accident
rather than the time of trial in order not to encourage delaying tactics by either side in the hope of
obtaining the advantage of knowledge or data not yet developed but bearing upon the issue of
dangerousness.
224. See generally Comment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability The Assualt Upon the
Citadel of Strict Liability, 23 S.D.L. REv. 149 (1978).
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